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Abstract
We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for
the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrializa-
tion are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which
demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy
equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricul-
tural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is
endogenous and linked to productivity di¤erences between the two locations and survival
probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-
as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the
land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated
version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is
consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.
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1 Introduction
The late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Unites States were characterized by a movement
from a primarily rural and agricultural economy to a primarily urban and industrial economy.
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of the U.S. population between 1800 and 1940.1 In
the beginning of the 19th century 94% of the population was living in rural areas. By 1940
the share of population living in rural areas was 43.5%, while the share living on the farm was
only 23%. Coincident with this dramatic shift in the structure of the economy came changes
in the institutional needs of the population. The sorts of social care arrangements that were
common place on the farm were harder to implement and enforce in the city, and the shifting
population gave rise to new political coalitions with disparate views on social policy. Many
prominent accounts of changing institutions of this period, e.g. Wiebe (1966), Sass (1997) and
Schieber and Shoven (1999), emphasize the critical role that urbanization and industrialization
played in the creation of new institutions: The willingness of the U.S. to nally go the route of
so many other countries in adopting a national social insurance program in 1935 was the result
of three major forces. The rst was the increased dependence on wage income that had arisen
over the preceding half-century as the country had industrialized,(Schieber and Shoven 1999,
page 18). Indeed, the Social Security Administration (2003) characterizes the year 1920 as a
historical tipping-point. In that year, for the rst time in our nations history, more people were
living in cities than on farms.Of course there were other forces besides industrialization: The
second force was the terrible economic environment caused by the Great Depression. And the
third was a complicated set of political movements raising fundamental questions about economic
and political structures we had adopted,(Schieber and Shoven 1999, page 18). Although the
Great Depression is often considered a major impetus for the social security legislation in the
U.S., its e¤ects are far from clear. Miron and Weil (1998) conclude their study on the origins
of social security by stating that: Regarding the lasting impact of the Great Depression, our
conclusion is that there was surprisingly little,(page 321).2 Furthermore, although the Great
Depression stimulated some support for social security as a means to improve the conditions of
struggling poor (Temin 1991), the fact that many industrialized countries introduced a social
security system before the Great Depression suggests that other, more fundamental forces must
be in play. The contribution of this paper is to provide the rst economic mechanism that can lead
1Appendix A provides data sources for all gures and tables.
2On the macroeconomic e¤ects of Great Depression, see Cole and Ohanian (2004).
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social security to emerge as a direct result of simultaneous urbanization and industrialization.
While ours may not be the only mechanism at work, we demonstrate in a simple, empirically
plausible framework that it is consistent with the experience of the United States prior to, and
immediately after the introduction of social security.
We propose that the rural (agricultural) to urban (industrial) shift is a critical factor explain-
ing the emergence of social insurance, more specically, social security. The correlation between
urbanization and social insurance has been recognized by political scientists and sociologists.3
Figure 2 shows the level of urbanization and the fraction of the elderly (65+) population across
U.S. states in 1930. About 23 states (those encircled) introduced a state pension plan before
the 1935 Social Security Act. Of those, 18 states had an urbanization rate higher than the U.S.
average. The correlation between the fraction of elderly population and state pensions is also
positive but smaller than that for urbanization (only 65% of states with higher than average
elderly population had adopted pension plans). Although this picture provides only suggestive
evidence, the basic relation seems to hold up to closer empirical scrutiny. Amenta and Car-
ruthers (1988) look at the timing of old age pension plan adoption among U.S. states. They nd
a statistically signicant e¤ect of urbanization on the passage of old age pension plans. More
compelling is that the relationship remains in cross-country data. Figure 3 shows the correlation
between the fraction of the labor force in agriculture at the start of the 20th century and the
date in which a social security system was introduced among European countries. Clearly, a
larger labor force in agriculture is associated with later adoption. Kim (2001) investigates the
timing of old-age pension adoption across O.E.C.D. countries in more detail and nds that the
percent of labor not employed in agriculture is strongly associated with the adoption of old-age
pensions.
Figure 3 suggests that social security was adopted relatively late in the U.S. Furthermore,
according to Figure 2, many of the states in the U.S. with low urbanization were Southern
states where agricultural interests and land inequality was stronger. Galor, Moav and Vollrath
(2009) show that land inequality as a reection of strong agricultural interest was a deterrent to
the adoption of human capital promoting institutions in the U.S., such as public schooling and
child labor regulations. They demonstrate that this lack of investment reduced the mobility of
workers and slowed the transition from an agricultural to an urban economy. Their framework
highlights how the distribution of land is important for the pace of industrialization. In a similar
vein, one reason for the late adoption of social security (which is more attractive for industrial
3See eg. Pryor (1968) and Collier and Messick (1975)
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workers) might have been the opposition by Southern states in the U.S. Wealthy land holders,
who had little need for social security, beneted from the lack of such programs as they reduced
the incentive for their workers to migrate. Indeed, the struggle over the introduction of social
security might also reect the divergent interests of agricultural and industrial elites, which we
abstract from in the current analysis.
We argue that industrialization combined with demographic shifts can account for the dra-
matic change in the social insurance system in the United States. Farmers rely on land inheritance
for their old age. As a result, they do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system since
they have little incentive to save to start with. With structural change, people migrate to the
city and the land loses its economic value. Social security becomes an attractive way to shift
resources to older ages and support for social security arises. To formalize this argument, we
develop an overlapping generations economy with two sectors, which we interpret as agricultural
and industrial. Farm production requires capital, labor and land. Land is a xed factor, so there
are decreasing returns to labor. City production on the other hand requires capital and labor and
exhibits constant returns to scale.4 Agents in this economy live up to three periods, as young,
middle aged and old. They face an exogenous probability of dying at the end of the second
period of their lives. In each period agents earn wages in the sector in which they are located.
We assume that they can save, but are unable to borrow. Land is passed from one generation
to another by inheritance, as are accidental capital bequests. Each period young agents make
a once and for all decision about where to live.5 There is also a social security mechanism that
can tax the young and the middle aged and pay transfers to the old.
The savings and optimal tax decisions of agents in this environment imply that an agent will
support social security if the following two conditions hold: First, the return to social security
4Hansen and Prescott (2002) model the industrial revolution as a switch from a (Malthus) production technol-
ogy with a xed factor of production, land, to a (Solow) production technology, with no xed factors. Parente and
Prescott (2005) use a similar framework to study the evolution of international income levels since 1750. Galor
and Weil (2000) provides a framework in which transition from stagnation to growth occurs endogenously within
a unied framework. Laitner (2000) studies a two-good, two-sector model in which, like Hansen and Prescott
(2002), only the agricultural sector uses land. He investigates why the savings rate increases with development.
Other well-known models of structural change are Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001).
Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) model the shift of labor from agricul-
ture to manufacturing, and the associated pattern of rural to urban migration that is associated with process of
economic development.
5Among recent models with an explicit location decision see Vandenbroucke (2008), Hassler, Rodríguez Mora,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005), and Klein and Ventura (2009).
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must be greater than the return to private assets. For a middle-aged agent, the return to social
security is relatively high because he views the cost as one period of tax payments, while his
benets next period are based on two generations worth of payments. There is also an annuity
component to social security, where the returns are divided amongst the surviving agents. Second,
the agent must want to save for old age. Whether or not the middle-aged individual wants to
save for old age depends crucially on his age-income prole. If his income prole is steep, i.e.
he expects to earn substantially more in old-age, he is unlikely to want to sacrice resources in
middle age for even more consumption in old age. In our framework, those middle-aged farmers
who have a surviving parent do not inherit land while middle aged. However, they inherit land in
old age, conditional on survival. Both middle-aged farmers who own land and middle-aged-city
workers have relatively atter age-income proles, and are more likely to support social security.
We show that in a situation where everyone is living on the farm, if the age-income prole
of middle-aged-landless farmers is steep enough, a majority of the population will oppose the
implementation of social security. These individuals prefer to rely on their land inheritance for
old-age security. Once enough rural-urban migration takes place, a majority of the population
will no longer be in a position to inherit land, and social security is implemented.
In order to quantify whether our story is consistent with the experience of the United States
before (1800) and after (1940) social security is introduced, we need to take a stand on how pref-
erences over tax levels are aggregated in a political process. In doing so, we merge two literatures:
the political economy of social security and the economics of structural change. This allows us
to study the set of demographic, social, and economic conditions that give rise to an economy
without social security and the changes that would eventually lead to the introduction of publicly
managed old age security. We assume that the level of the social security tax is determined by
majority voting.6 In the initial steady state of this economy the relative productivity of the farm
sector is high and survival probabilities are low. As a result, farm incomes are high relative to
city incomes. All agents live on the farm, and land is an important source of income for the old.
The median voter is a middle-aged farmer who does not own land and who prefers a zero social
security tax. Once the city is more productive and individuals live longer, people migrate, and
the importance of land diminishes. In the nal steady state, the median voter is a middle-aged-
city worker who prefers a positive social security tax. While the framework is relatively simple,
6The current paper follows the recent literature on dynamic models of political economy; see among others
Krusell, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (1997), Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1999), Hassler, Rodríguez Mora, Storesletten and
Zilibotti (2003), and Corbea, DErasmo and Kuruscu (2009).
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it leads to a rich political economy environment. The identity of the median voter is not just age,
but also location, which turns out to be critical for generating the emergence of social security.
This is achieved by merging the structural transformation from farm to city with the political
economy of institutions, in this case social security. Hence, the current paper is closely related
to the literature that links structural changes with changes in political and social institutions.7
There is a large literature on the political economy of social security systems that analyzes
the political sustainability of Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security.8 The conclusion of most
of this literature is that support for social security in democratic societies depends on the age
of the median voter.9 These papers are oriented toward explaining why an existing system can
survive, expand or shrink.10 They cannot address why such a system was started in the rst
place, or more precisely, why such systems have not always existed.11 By allowing the identity of
the median voter to include his geographical location, we overcome this shortcoming and provide
a framework in which the emergence of social security is a response to the urbanization of the
7Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) study how skilled bias technological progress, which lowers fertility and increases
the importance of education, can lead to the adoption of child labor laws. Galor and Moav (2006) show that it
might be in capitalistsown interest to expand public education to the masses as a result of the growing importance
of human capital for the production process. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) show that the growing importance of
human capital can also trigger men to grant political rights to women. Galor et al (2009) study the e¤ects of the
concentration of land ownership on human capital accumulation and growth within a political economy model.
Bertocchi (2011) studies the long run decline in the importance of bequest taxes within a two-sector (agriculture
and manufacturing) dynamic political economy model. In her model, land is easier to tax than capital. The
decline of agriculture, which reduces the value of land, makes bequest taxes an unattractive option over time.
8There also exists a large literature that analyzes macroeconomic and distributional implications of the current
social security system without political economy considerations (e.g. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines 1985).
9Cooley and Soares (1999), Galasso (1999), and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) build models in which non-
altruistic median voters decide to keep an existing system. The median voters decision depends on two factors
in these models: First, there exists a reputational mechanism in place which eliminates all future benets if the
median voter deviates from the current arrangement. Therefore, a median voter cannot avoid taxes today and
hope to get benets in the future. Second, the median voter might want to keep an existing social security system
in order to benet from the high interest rates associated with a depressed capital stock.
10For example, Cooley and Soares (1996) study an economy in which the initial generation votes over a social
security replacement rule that depends on the age structure of the population. Hence, as the population structure
changes (e.g. as a result of the Baby Boom) a rule that was sustainable in the past can become unsustainable.
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2005) link the size of intergenerational transfers to the age structure of the population.
Conesa and Krueger (1999) study how the status-quo bias is related to idiosyncratic uncertainty.
11Krueger and Kubler (2005) study how the introduction of an unfunded social security system can be Pareto
improving in an economy with incomplete markets.
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population.
1.1 Facts
What were the economic and demographic forces that led to this shift from rural to urban popu-
lation? One obvious answer to this question is the increase in the city wage relative to the farm
wage that arose from greater technical change in the city relative to the farm. GDP per person
employed increased by a factor of 3.5 in the U.S. between 1870 and 1940 (Maddison 2001). While
productivity in both the agriculture and the non-agricultural sectors grew rapidly during this
period, the growth in non-agricultural sectors was faster than the growth in agriculture, leading
to the transformation of the U.S. economy (see Greenwood and Seshadri 2002 and Greenwood
and Uysal 2005). Figure 4 shows the change in total factor productivity (TFP) in agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors in the United States. Between 1800 and 1940, TFP grew by a factor
of 1.92 in agriculture, while it grew by a factor of 4.21 in manufacturing.
Another possible impetus for rural-urban migration is the increase in life expectancy that
took place over this time period. As life expectancy increased, two important changes occurred
in the agricultural sector. First, the amount of farm labor relative to farm land rose, causing farm
wages to fall. Second, as farmers lived longer, the transfer of land ownership via inheritance was
delayed. Both events increased the relative attractiveness of living in the city for farmers, and
encouraged rural-urban migration. Of crucial importance for this story is not that life expectancy
at birth increased, but that life expectancy conditional on reaching or getting near retirement
age increased. Figure 5 shows the changes in conditional survival probabilities from age 60 to
65, from 65 to 70, from 70 to 75, and from 75 to 80. Survival probabilities increased by about
5 percentage points between 1850 and 1900, and by another 2 percentage points between 1900
and 1940.
What were the key features of the 19th century farm economy? First, the old in the 19th
century had relatively more wealth than the old in the 20th century and land as an illiquid asset
provided an important source of income and wealth for the elderly. In 1850, those 60 years or
older had about three times as much real estate wealth as the 30-39 age group (seeWilliamson and
Lindert 1980, Table 1.7) and an analogous picture emerges for total wealth in 1870 (see Soltow
1992, Table 3.2). It is also true that today agents around retirement age, 65-69, have high levels
of wealth. Their relative position, however, has deteriorated. Typical age-wealth proles from
the 19th century show a continuous rise until age 70 and a slight decline afterwards. By 1962,
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the age-wealth proles had two peaks, one for ages 55-59 and another for 65-69. By 1982, the
rst peak occurred for even younger ages, 45-49 (Wolf 1992). It is therefore not surprising that
Schieber and Shoven (1999) conclude that the over-65 age cohort controlled more wealth than
any other group in the early 19th century.
Second, the land was illiquid. Land was very slow to sell, people had to use costly adver-
tisements in the newspaper or word of mouth. Land, unlike other securities, was useless unless
it was worked or rented, so it wasnt a preferred collateral. Mortgaging land was di¢ cult; "it
almost never seemed clear who owned what land, how much that land was worth, and whether
prospective borrowers had mortgaged the land elsewhere" (Wright 2001, page 28).
Third, inheritance, and in particular inheritance of land, played a key role in wealth accumu-
lation. According to Soltow (1982) inheritance was the determining factor of wealth inequality in
the U.S. during the 19th century. Inheritance was a much more signicant factor than life-cycle
savings in explaining the relationship between age and wealth in the U.S. in 1870. Overtime, with
longer life expectancy and sustained economic growth, the importance of inheritance declined.
DeLong (2003) estimates that in pre-industrial times inheritance contributed around 90% to
wealth acquisition of a cohort, while the share of inheritance is less than 50% today. The situa-
tion in the 19th century America, with its dynamic economy and emphasis on equal division of
bequests, was likely less dramatic than pre-industrial times, but still the role of inheritance must
have been much bigger than today. Moreover, land was the most important form of inheritance
in the 19th century.12 The farm population consisted mainly of workers and owner-farmers.
Renting the land to others was not common. According to Yang (1992), about 90% of farmers
were owners in 1860.13 Young and middle-age workers without land look forward to inheriting
land when old and therefore see little need for other savings vehicles.14
Finally, the long-term borrowing opportunities were very limited, if not non-existent. Informal
credit networks in which farmers and artisans borrowed from merchants and from each other were
active even before the establishment of banks and other formal credit institutions (Rothenberg
1992). These informal credit arrangements, however, mainly served short term credit needs of
12In his study of Butler County (Ohio), Newell (1986) documents that for the 1803-1865 period, inheritance
consisted almost exclusively of real property.
13Even at the end of the 19th Century, most farmers were owners, see Barlowe and Timmons (1950).
14As Sass (1997, page 5) points out "The family enterprise institution also vested the old with powerful property
rights vis-a-vis their adult children. Elderly parents held rst claim on the rm and its assets, while their o¤spring
remained dependent for their incomes and inheritance... parents retained ownership over the main body of family
assets and chose when they would transfer farms and businesses to their children."
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farmers, and did not provide them with enough credit to smooth their life-cycle consumption.
Hence, while middle-aged farmers could borrow small amounts for a few months, they were a
long way from borrowing against the land they might acquire in the future. Establishment of
formal banks did not change this picture in a fundamental way.
The Bank of North America, the rst bank in the modern sense, was established in 1781 in
Philadelphia. The following decades witnessed an increase in the number of Banks from about 28
in 1800 to 824 in 1850 (Carter et al 2006, Table Cj142-148). Despite this increase in the number
of banks, the nancial sector did not serve the long-term credit needs of agriculture. The Bank of
North America was a strictly commercial bank. The tension between the short term commercial
needs of merchants and the long term credit needs of farmers was a key aspect of the early U.S.
banking. The early banks, with merchants as their main stockholders, were mainly engaged in
providing short term commercial credit. As Table I documents, the maturity of credit was very
short and the amount of credit was small. Per capita loans and discounts by banks was about
16% of GDP per capita in 1850 and the maximum maturity was 6 months. Not surprisingly, a
large segment of the population did not directly deal with a bank.15
Table I - Banks and Credits
Year Population GDP Loans and Discounts Loans and Discounts Credit
(thousand) per capita by Banks (thousand $) (per capita) Maturities
1800 5297 98 30-45 days
1820 9618 86 60-90 days
1834 14504 86 324119 22 6 months
1840 17120 101 462897 27 6 months
1850 23261 109 364204 16 6 months
Wang (2008) studies the distribution of borrowers from Plymouth Bank in Plymouth County,
Massachusetts. This was the rst bank in Massachusetts, and its practices show that the intro-
duction of banks did not broaden access to credit. In the early 1800s, about 60% of bank cus-
tomers for credit were merchants, while farmers represented only 8%. During that same period,
15This was true even for nancially developed cities like New York. "Most early New Yorkers did not have
a bank account. In 1825 New York contained about 60,000 people per solvent commercial bank. By 1835 this
number had dropped to about 26,000. But even in 1855, when New York had 11,000 people per bank, .... it is
clear fairly large segments of the population did not have direct dealings with New York Banks" (Wright 2001,
page 114).
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more than half (54%) of the adult population in Plymouth county were engaged in agriculture,
in contrast to merchants who were only 12%. By 1850, there was not much improvements in the
representation of farmers among credit customers.16
Even when mortgages were available in later years, only available mortgages were short-
term, balloon mortgages. Such loans are unamortized. Periodic payments meet the interest but
contribute nothing to the principal, which is payable in full at maturity. Mortgages typically
lasted three years or less and might be renewed, though renewal conditions were never certain...As
late as 1890, only 29% of farmers were encumbered by mortgages, and among those that were,
the debt average about 35% of their worth.(Atack et al 2000, page 275).
These conditions led to the populist movement of the late 19th century, which responded to
the fact that farmers were credit constrained, and placed the blame on Wall Street and Eastern
bankers. In the early 20th century, the government began various agricultural credit programs
(such as the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916) to try to alleviate these problems but they were of
limited success. The problems of inadequate access to credit for farmers continued into the early
20th century.
In the next section we describe the economic environment and the recursive competitive
equilibrium given an exogenous political process. We characterize agentsdecisions, given xed
prices in Section 3. Here, we also demonstrate analytically how an economy shifts from an
agrarian population with no social security system to a primarily urban population with a social
security system. In Section 4 we describe how taxes are determined. We discuss the results of
our quantitative exercises in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 Environment
Consider the following one-good, two-sector overlapping generations model. In the rst sector (or
location), which we will call the farm, capital, labor and land are combined to produce output.
In the second sector (or location), which we call the city, the same good is produced using capital
and labor.
Agents live a maximum of 3 periods, which we refer to as young, middle-aged and old, and
face a probability, ; of surviving from the second to the last period. Let  be the discount
16According to Wang (2008, page 446): "Namely, farmers and artisans did not have easy access to banks.
They usually borrowed in the personal credit market." (page 446). "Thus despite a well-developed market, most
potential borrowers in Massachusetts did not have access to bank credit." (page 456).
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factor. The objective of a young person is to maximize
U(cy; cm; co) = u(cy) + u(cm) + 
2u(co); (1)
where ci; i 2 fy;m; og ; denotes age-i consumption, and u is continuous, strictly increasing and
strictly concave.
Each period every middle-aged person has a child who is born into their parents location.
When an agent is born on the farm, he makes a once-and-for-all decision to stay there or move to
the city. Those who are born in the city are not allowed to move to the farm. Middle-aged and
old agents cant change their location.17 Let the fraction of young, middle-aged and old agents
who live on the farm be denoted by y; m and o; respectively.
In both locations young, middle-aged and old all inelastically supply one unit of labor.18
Agents are endowed with location dependent e¢ ciency units "ji ; j 2 ff; cg and i 2 fy;m; og :
Since only a fraction  of middle-aged people survive to old age, the total labor supply on
the farm is given by N f = y"fy + m"
f
m + o"
f
o and the total labor supply in the city by
N c = (1   y)"cy + (1   m)"cm + (1   o)"co. Agents are located either in the city or on the
farm and can only work in that sector. There is a competitive labor market in each location.
Let wj denote the wages in sector j: The labor income of an age-i agent in location j is wj"ji for
i 2 fy;m; og and j 2 ff; cg.
People are not allowed to borrow, but can accumulate capital and rent it to rms in either
sector at a competitive rate, . Capital moves costlessly between the farm and the city, so let
r =    be the common rate of return to capital, where  2 [0; 1] is the common rate of capital
depreciation. There is no market in which agents can buy and sell land. Each agent is born
without any assets (including land). On the farm, when an agent dies (at the end of the second
or third period), his land is inherited by the oldest surviving descendant. Therefore, a fraction
of the land is owned by the o surviving old, and the remainder is owned by the (1   )m
middle-aged who inherited land early. Below we refer to middle-aged farmers with land as landed
farmers and those without land as landless farmers. We normalize the total amount of land to
1, so each landholding farmer has 1
o+(1 )m units of land. Farmers rent their land to rms at
a competitive rate q:
17The vast majority of migration from the farm to the city consisted of young workers. (Schieber and Shoven
(1999), p. 18, and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), pp. 139, 465)
18We therefore abstract from the rise in retirement (i.e. decline in the labor force participation of old) since
the 1850s. See Kopecky (2011) for a model with endogenous retirement that links this rise to the technological
progress in the production of leisure goods.
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In both locations some middle-aged agents receive accidental capital bequests from their
parents. As a result, middle-aged agents di¤er in their asset and land holdings on the farm,
while they only di¤er by their asset levels in the city. If a young farmer chooses to move to
the city, he gives up all claims on his parents land, and that land, upon his parents death, is
divided equally among the remaining land owners (we show later that relaxing this assumption
does not change the main results). However, he still receives any accidental asset bequest his
parent might leave, as we assume capital can freely move between the farm and the city.
Each sector is populated by a large number of production units (family farms in the agri-
cultural sector and factories in the city sector) which have access to constant returns to scale
production functions represented by
Y f = fF f (Kf ; N f ; L); (2)
and
Y c = cF c(Kc; N c); (3)
where variables Y j; Kj; N j and L, j 2 ff; cg; refer to output, capital, and labor employed in
each sector, and land used in the farm sector, respectively. The parameter j; j 2 ff; cg; is the
total factor productivity (TFP) in sector j. Land is a xed factor and used only in the farm
sector.
Given the wage rate in sector j; wj; the rental rate for capital,  and the rental rate for land,
q; the problem of a production unit in the farm sector is given by
max
Nf ;Kf ;L

Y f   wfN f   Kf   qL	 ;
subject to (2), and in the city sector by
max
Nc;Kc
fY c   wcN c   Kcg ;
subject to (3).
Finally, there is an economy-wide social security system that collects a lump-sum tax,  ; from
the young and the middle-aged and provides each old with an amount 2=:
2.1 Recursive Equilibrium
At any point in time, the aggregate state in this economy consists of the distribution of capital
across agents, the distribution of agents across the city and the farm, and the prevailing tax
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level. Since agents are born without any capital, all capital is owned by the middle-aged and
the old. Because they make di¤erent decisions, we di¤erentiate between the asset distribution
of those in the city and those on the farm, and between the farmers with land and the farmers
without land. We represent the distribution of capital across old city and farm residents by co
and fo , and middle-aged city residents and farmers by 
c
m and 
f
m ; with  = 1; 0 indicating
whether a middle-aged farmer is landed,  = 1; or landless,  = 0: In what follows we let
 = (cm; 
c
o; 
f1
m ; 
f0
m ; 
f
o) be the set of asset distributions. We represent the distribution of
agents between the two locations, city and farm, by  = (y; m; o); where j is the fraction of
age-j agents who live on the farm.
Let, S = (;; ) be the aggregate state. The evolution of the aggregate state is given by two
functions, G and H, where 0 = G(S) is next periods asset distribution and 0 = H(S) is next
periods distribution of agents across locations, given the current state S. When individuals solve
their problems, they take the transition functions G and H as given. However, G and H; must
be consistent with individual decisions in equilibrium. In online Appendix B, we analyze how
the savings and location decisions of agents determine the evolution of the asset distribution and
the fraction of agents living in each location. Below, we rst describe the recursive competitive
equilibrium given a constant tax level,  : In Section 4, we allow  to be determined and possibly
change through majority voting in a political economy equilibrium.
2.1.1 City Problem
We begin by describing the economic problem of agents in the city. We approach agentsproblems
recursively, starting from the problem of an old agent, whose state consists of the aggregate state,
S = (;; ); and his individual asset level a. Let V co (a; S) denote the value of being an old
person with asset level, a: Since the old will simply consume their total resources, this is given
by
V co (a; S) = u(w
c"co + (1 + r)a+
2

); (4)
where for expositional clarity we suppress the dependence of r and wc on the aggregate state S:
Next, we look at the decisions of middle-aged agents. Their decisions are determined by
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V cm(a; S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cm + (1 + r)a     a0) + V co (a0; S 0)g ; (5)
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); );
a0  0;
where next periods distribution of assets across agents, 0, is given by G(S); and the distribution
of agents between the two locations, 0; is given byH(S): Let acm(a; S) denote the savings decision
of a middle-aged-city person with individual asset level, a; that results from problem (5).
Finally, we consider the decisions of the young agents who are born in the city. Let b(a; S)
denote the bequest a young agent receives if his middle-aged parent starts middle-age with assets,
a; and dies before reaching old age. The problem of a young agent is then given by
V cy (b(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cy      a0) + V cm(a0; S 0) (6)
+(1  )V cm(a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); );
a0  0:
Let acy(b(a; S); S) be the savings decision of a young agent who expects to get b(a; S) as a bequest
next period.
2.1.2 Farm Problem
The value function for an old agent on the farm is similar to the old agents in the city, except
the old farmer earns land income. His value function is given by
V fo (a; S) = u

wf"fo + (1 + r)a+
q
o + (1  )m +
2


; (7)
where 1
o+(1 )m is the per capita amount of land on the farm, and as in equation (4), we
suppress the dependence of prices, wf ; r; and q; on S:
The problem of middle-aged agents on the farm di¤ers from that of those in the city, because
middle-aged farmers di¤er in land-holding status. Let  = 0 if the farmer is landless, and let
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 = 1 if the farmer is landed. The middle-aged farmers problem can be written, for  = 0; 1; as
V fm (a; S) = max
a0
fu

wf"fm + (1 + r)a+
q
o + (1  )m      a
0

(8)
+V fo (a
0; S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); ):
a0  0:
Let afm (a; S) be the decision rule for middle-aged farmers. Note that a middle-aged-landed
farmer who survives to old age may have a di¤erent level of land holdings than he has today.
Land per farmer may change due to migration, since migration alters the distribution of agents
across locations, which is captured by 0 = H(S).
When considering the young farmers savings decision, we need to do so jointly with his
location decision. His saving decision will depend on where he chooses to live. First, consider a
young farmer who stays on the farm. If his parent dies next period, he will receive an accidental
capital bequest. The amount will depend on his parents savings decision, which depends on the
land holding status of the parent. Therefore, although the young do not di¤er by asset level or
land holding, we label them with their parents asset and land holding status. In particular, let
b(a; S) denote the capital bequest that a young agent gets upon the early death of his parent,
who has a units of capital and land holding status  = 0; 1: Note that if his parent dies, he will
also receive the land his parent leaves behind. A young agent who decides to stay solves
V fsy (b
(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wf"fy      a0) + V f0m (a0; S 0) + (9)
(1  )V f1m (a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); );
a0  0:
Let his savings decision be represented by a0 = afsy (b
(a; S); S):
Next consider a young farmer who goes to the city. If his parent dies, he will only receive a
capital bequest of b(a; S): He solves
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V fgy (b
(a; S); S) = max
a0
fu(wc"cy      a0) + V cm(a0; S 0) + (10)
(1  )V cm(a0 + b(a; S); S 0)g;
s:t: S 0 = (G(S); H(S); );
a0  0:
Let his savings decision be given by a0 = afgy (b
(a; S); S):
Finally, let L(b(a; S); S) be an indicator of whether the young farmer is a goer or a stayer,
which is simply determined by comparing his expected lifetime utility in each location, i.e.
L(b(a; S); S) =
(
1, if V fgy (b
(a; S); S)  V fsy (b(a; S); S)
0, otherwise
: (11)
2.1.3 Equilibrium
Given a policy  ; a recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a set of value
functions, V cy (b(a; S); S); V
c
m(a; S); and V
c
o (a; S); for agents who live in the city and V
fs
y (a; S);
V fgy (a; S); V
f
m (b
(a; S); S);  = 0; 1; and V fo (a; S) for agents who live on the farm; a set of
decision rules acy(b
c(a; S); S) and acm(a; S) for agents who live in the city, and a
fs
y (b
(a; S); S);
afgy (b
(a; S); S) and afm (a; S);  = 0; 1; for agents who live on the farm; a location rule for young
farmers, L(b(a; S); S);  = 0; 1; a set of pricing functions r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S); and
aggregate laws of motion G(S) and H(S) such that:
 Given the transition functions G(S) and H(S); and pricing functions r(S); wc(S); wf (S);
and q(S); the value functions and corresponding decision rules solve the appropriate house-
hold problems in equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11), with b(a; S) = acm(a; S)
and b(a; S) = afm (a; S);  = 0; 1:
 The pricing functions, r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S); are determined by prot maximization
of production units in each sector together with a no arbitrage condition for capital, i.e.
r(S); wc(S); wf (S); and q(S) satisfy
wc(S) = F c2 (K
c; N c);
wf (S) = F f2 (K
f ; N f ; L);
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q(S) = F f3 (K
f ; N f ; L);
and,
r(S) +  = F c1 (K
c; N c) = F f1 (K
f ; N f ; L);
with aggregate labor and capital in each sector given by
N f = y"
f
y + m"
f
m + o"
f
o ;
N c = (1  y)"cy + (1  m)"cm + (1  o)"co:
and,
K = Kc +Kf = Ac + Af ;
where Ac and Af are given by equations (22) and (23), and Kc and Kf are determined by
the no arbitrage condition.
 The aggregate transition functions, G and H, are consistent with individual decisions as
detailed in online Appendix B.
3 Individual decisions with exogenous prices
In this section, we analyze individual savings decisions when prices are constant and exogenous.
We also characterize the optimal social security tax for each agent type, assuming that the social
security tax remains constant. At this point, we do not conjecture how these preferences are
aggregated within a political process. We simply illustrate how a social security system emerges
in the sense that a majority of agents change their preferred tax from zero to something strictly
positive, as the fundamentals of our environment (TFP levels in the city versus the farm and
survival probabilities) change.19
Since all old agents die at the end of the period, they merely consume their income, and their
preferred tax level is innite. Hence, we start by characterizing the behavior of middle-aged
agents.
19Online Appendix C contains the degree to which we can analytically order preferred tax levels by voter age
and location.
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3.1 Middle-Aged Agents
The preferred tax level of a middle-aged person, whether a farmer or a city worker, depends on
the return to social security relative to the return to capital. The return to an extra unit of
social security tax is 2

, while the return to an extra unit of capital is 1 + r. If the return to
social security (capital) is greater than the return to capital (social security), the middle-aged
agent will prefer to do all his saving via social security (capital). What is critical is that if the
individual does not want to save, his optimal social security tax is zero and he will not save using
either vehicle. Social security will only emerge if the agents want to save and the return to social
security is greater than the return to capital.
We rst consider the problem of a middle-aged agent who faces a tax level  and enters the
period with asset level a: Note that a consists of both the assets he saved while young and any
accidental bequest he receives from his parent. Let Im (Io) be the total (wage and land) income
of the middle-aged (old) person. An individuals age-income prole is essential in predicting his
support for social security. If it is steep enough, he wants to borrow against the future instead of
saving for it, and will not support social security. On the other hand, if he is better o¤ moving
resources to his old age, social security may provide an attractive way of doing so. Since a
landless-middle-aged farmer will inherit land when he is old, he has a relatively steep age income
prole (compared to city and landed-middle-age individuals) and is less likely to want to use
social security to transfer even more resources to his old age. Proposition 1 characterizes the
middle-aged agents optimal savings decision. All the proofs are in online Appendix D.
Proposition 1. Let a0 be the optimal asset choice for a middle-aged agent. If a0 > 0, then
i. if 2

> 1 + r, @a
0
@
<  1;
ii. 1 + r > @a
0
@a
> 0;
iii. 1 > @a
0
@Im
> 0 and 0 > @a
0
@Io
>  1:
First, if the return to social security is greater than the return to capital, a middle-aged
individuals preferred asset choice will fall by more than one for one with social security taxes.20
Second, if the initial asset level of a middle-aged person rises, his optimal asset decision increases
20If the return to social security is less than the return to capital, no middle-aged person, and as we will show
in the next section, no young person will choose a positive tax level. As a result, how the asset choice changes
with the tax level is not relevant when 2 < 1 + r.
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because he will shift some resources to his old age. Third, reecting standard life-cycle consider-
ations, the optimal asset decision of a middle-aged person is increasing in his middle-age income
and decreasing in his old-age income, so as his age-income prole attens, he prefers to save
more.
We next characterize the middle-aged individuals optimal tax decision.21
Proposition 2. Let  be the optimal tax choice for a middle-aged voter with initial asset level
a. Let a0 be the optimal asset choice, given  . If 2

< 1+ r; then  = 0: If 2

> 1+ r, then a0 = 0:
Regardless of the initial asset level, every middle-aged person will choose a zero tax level if
the return to social security is less than the return to capital. At his preferred tax level, a middle-
aged agent will choose to save zero assets, doing all his savings via social security. However, if the
prevailing tax level is not optimal for a given middle-age person, he may wish to save a strictly
positive amount of assets to supplement his social security savings.
A middle-aged agents optimal tax level depends on his initial asset level, and his income
prole in a similar fashion as his optimal asset level does. Proposition 3 describes these relation-
ships.
Proposition 3. Let  be the optimal tax choice for a middle-aged agent. If   0, then
i. 1 + r > @
@a
 0;
ii. 1 > @
@Im
 0 and 0  @
@Io
>  1:
The preferred tax level of a middle-aged agent is increasing in his initial asset level, but by
less than 1 + r, the return to those assets. As income in middle age, Im; rises, his preferred
tax level rises, and as income in old age, Io; rises, his preferred tax level falls. As a result, the
landless-middle-age farmers, who have a steep age-income prole, are less likely to support social
security.
3.2 Young Agents
We next characterize the outcome of the optimal tax problem for young agents. This is more
complicated than characterizing the problem facing the middle-aged agents for two reasons. First,
21We assume that an individual can only choose a non-negative tax level. We discuss the possibility of negative
social security taxes in online Appendix E.
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there is an extra period which gives assets an alternative role of consumption smoothing across
periods that social security cannot ll. The return when old to saving one unit of consumption
when young and middle-aged via social security is 2

: The return when old to saving one unit
of consumption when young and middle-aged via assets is (1 + r)2 + 1 + r: We refer to this as
private saving that mimics social security. A young agent compares 2

with (1+ r)2+1+ r when
determining if he wants a positive level of social security.
Second, young agents anticipate accidental capital bequests from their middle-aged parents,
and these depend on the tax level. We show in Proposition 1 that as the tax level rises, the
asset level of the middle-aged person falls (assuming the asset level is positive, otherwise it is
constant at zero). When choosing his optimal tax level, the young person takes into account
the non-positive e¤ect the tax has on his potential bequest. As a result, from a young persons
perspective, the total return in old age of an extra unit of  is given by 2

+ (1 + r)2 @b
@
, where
@b
@
 0; and the growth factor (1 + r)2 reects the fact that the agent will consume his bequest
when he is old. For a young person who gets no bequest, the total return in old age of an extra
unit of  , is given by 2

, as @b
@
= 0: Note that the cost of social security is higher for middle-aged
agents whose parents survive as they experience a lower income in their middle-age.
With accidental bequests, there is uncertainty about what a young agents asset level will be
when entering middle-age. Therefore, the young individual chooses an asset level in each state
of his middle-aged world: when his parent dies and he receives a bequest, and when his parent
survives and he receives no bequest. Let a1 be the asset decision while young, a02 be the asset
decision when middle-aged without a bequest, and a12 be the asset decision when middle-aged
with a bequest.
In Proposition 4, we characterize the young persons optimal tax decision.
Proposition 4. Let  be the optimal tax choice for a young agent. Let a1 be the optimal asset
choice while young, a02 be the optimal asset choice while middle-aged without a bequest, and a
1
2
be the optimal asset choice while middle-aged with a bequest, given  . If 2

+ (1 + r)2 @b
@

=0
<
1 + r + (1 + r)2, then  = 0: If 2

+ (1 + r)2 @b
@
> 1 + r + (1 + r)2; then   0; and it follows that
if a1 > 0 and a02 > 0, then a
1
2 = 0; if a1 > 0 and a
1
2 > 0; then a
0
2 = 0; and if a
0
2 > 0 and a
1
2 > 0;
then a1 = 0:
If the return to private saving that mimics social security is greater than the return to
taxation, then the young person will choose a zero tax level. Because the e¤ect of the tax level
on the bequest is non-positive, this part of the proposition implies that if 2

< 1+ r+(1+ r)2; all
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young people will prefer a zero tax level. On the other hand, if the return to taxation, including
the non-positive e¤ect it has on his potential bequest, is greater than the return to private saving
that mimics social security, the young person may choose a positive tax level, but he will never
choose a strictly positive asset level in all states. At least one of his asset level choices must
be zero. The agent still may choose to use assets to smooth between periods one and two, or
between periods two and three, but he will not choose strictly positive savings in all states. This
simply reects the fact that social security, which yields a higher return, provides a better way
to move resources to old age, hence having positive savings in all states is not optimal. Once
again, as in the case of middle-aged individuals, if the young agent is choosing the tax level, he
will only choose an operative social security system if its return is greater than the return to
private saving that mimics social security, and if he wants to save for old age in each state of
both of the rst two periods.
3.3 How Social Security Emerges
Suppose everyone lives on the farm,  = 1, and that the return to capital is such that
1 + r <
2

< 1 + r + (1 + r)2:
In this situation there is measure one of young farmers, who all prefer no social security (Propo-
sition 4), measure  of middle-aged-landless farmers and measure 1    of middle-aged-landed
farmers, who prefer a positive social security tax if they want to save (Proposition 2), and mea-
sure  of old farmers, who would like an innite social security tax. The total population is
2 + : What is the preferred tax level of the middle-aged-landless farmer? Since 1 + r < 2

; we
know from Proposition 2 that if he wants to save, he will save entirely through social security,
and his asset choice is zero. His preferred tax level satises the following rst order condition
 u0  wf"fm + (1 + r)a  + 2u0wf"fo + q + 2

 0:
If 2u0
 
wf"fo + q

< u0
 
wf"fm + (1 + r)a

, then the agent would like to consume more when he
is middle-aged, and his optimal choice is  = 0: If   1
2
; this implies that if income in old-age
(wf"fo + q) is greater than income in middle-age (w
f"fm+(1+ r)a), the preferred tax level is zero.
In the more relevant case, when  > 1
2
; if we assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
utility function with curvature parameter , then wf ["fo   (2)1="fm]+ q  (2)1=[1+ r]a > 0; is
su¢ cient for  = 0: The wedge in income between old-age and middle-age for a landless farmer is
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given by the di¤erence in labor earnings between the two ages plus the land earnings he receives
in old age minus his discounted asset income in middle-age. If this wedge is big enough, then
the middle-aged-landless farmer will prefer a zero tax level. If the middle-aged-landless farmers
prefer a zero social security tax, then they along with the young make up a majority of the
population, 1+
2+
> 1
2
, who oppose a social security system. What is critical here is that even
when social security provides a high return, i.e. 2= > 1 + r; the middle-aged-landless farmers
will choose not to implement social security if they do not want to shift resources to old-age.
Suppose a change in the model environment leads to rural-urban migration due to a relative
increase in city wages or higher survival probabilities.22 Once migration takes place, there is
measure one of young, regardless of location. Given the assumption that 2

< 1 + r + (1 + r)2;
they all prefer a zero tax level. There is measure  of the old, all of whom prefer an innite
amount of social security. However, through migration the distribution of middle-aged agents is
now spread across landless farmers, , landed farmers, (1  ), and city workers, 1  , who
may or may not prefer a positive level of social security. Since 2

> 1 + r, the optimal tax level
of the landed farmers and city workers, who both have relatively at earnings proles, satises
the following rst order condition
 u0(Im + (1 + r)a  ) + 2u0(Io + 2

)  0:
Given that marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, if  > 1
2
and the e¢ ciency units are
constant or decreasing with age in each location, "jo  "jm; where j = c; f; then the tax level that
satises this inequality must be strictly positive. Therefore, these individuals prefer an operative
social security system as long as  > 1
2
and there is not an increase in labor e¢ ciency between
middle and old-age. It is also possible that through price movements induced by the technological
change and migration that landless farmers also now prefer a positive tax.23 However, even if they
do not, through migration (as  declines), the mass of individuals who support a social security
system, (1 )+(1 )+; increases, while the mass of those who oppose it, 1+, decreases.
In this example, if the landless farmers remain opposed, once  < 1
2
; a majority prefers a positive
22Indeed, the e¤ects of an increase in longevity are not obvious. Land is a xed factor on the farm, so
increasing survival probabilities reduces farm wages, but also increases the return to land. This crowding of land
could encourage young farmers to migrate to the city. With higher life expectancy one also waits longer to inherit
land, but is more likely to survive to old age. Whether an increase in life expectancy leads to migration is a
quantitative question, which we explore in Section 5.
23See Section 5.2.2 for an example of when price movements cause middle-aged-landless farmers to support
social security.
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tax. Middle-aged-city workers and middle-aged-landed farmers would like to implement social
security even though their age-income proles are relatively at. This is because middle-aged
agents only pay into the system one period, while their benets are based on two periods of
payments, making their return to social security high.
3.4 Caveats
We have so far made several strong modeling choices and as a result a few caveats are in order.
First, it is possible to relax (as we do in our quantitative analysis) the assumption that young
farmers who migrate lose all claims to land. As long as land income declines with the structural
transformation and does not provide a signicant source of income, the landless will be in favor
of social security.
Second, we restrict our attention to a pay-as-you-go system. This is an unrealistic description
of the system in its initial years. During the rst ten years, expenditures were about 15% of
total receipts and social security assets grew substantially. An alternative strategy would be to
allow agents to vote over both the level of benets and the tax level. Leaving aside the political
economy complications of voting over two issues, it is not clear adding this dimension to our
environment would change our conclusions. Agents in our model are not altruistic and there is
no aggregate uncertainty. As a result, a middle-aged median voter does not have any incentive
to propose a higher tax than the one necessary to nance the system. Furthermore, by 1957,
twenty years after its introduction, the system resembled a pay-as-you-go system with a ratio of
expenditures to receipts of about one (Social Security Administration 2012, Table 4.A1).
Third, we abstract from exogenous population growth or endogenous fertility decisions. The
fertility rate (measured as the children ever born or the total fertility rate) declined from about
5 children in the early 1800s to about 2.5 children by the early 1900s (Jones and Tertilt 2008).
As a result, the population became older over these years: among the adult (ages 15 years or
older) population, the fraction of 15 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64 and more than 65 years old were
33.2%, 42.2%, 19.6% and 4.9% in 1870. These fractions were 29.9%, 42.7%, 20.9%, 6.2% in 1900
and 24.2%, 40.2%, 26.4% and 9.1% in 1940 (Bureau of the Census 1949, Table B 81-144). It is
likely that the aging of the population increased the support for social security. By abstracting
from the demographic changes of the population, we stack the cards against the emergence of
social security. On the other hand, abstracting from the population structure, as we show in our
quantitative exercises, gives a relatively more important role to the technological change vis a
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vis demographics.24
Fourth, we assume that both capital and social security are safe assets. It is possible to argue
that compared to government bonds or the stock market, social security is a safer investment
option. This would provide an additional motive for introducing social security and possibly
allow us to link its emergence to the Great Depression. Although, as we mentioned in the
Introduction, the role the Great Depression played as an impetus for social security is not clear.
Finally, since we abstract from population growth, it is also quite natural to treat land as
a xed factor in the model. Although large tracks of land were available in the West, the
main impetus for East-West migration was the population pressure in the East. Indeed, creating
productive land was quite expensive and these costs were only incurred due to population pressure
(see Vandenbroucke, 2008).
4 Political Economy
To this point, we have assumed the tax level is constant and taken as given by individuals.
We demonstrated qualitatively how an agent determines his own optimal tax in this setting.
In order to evaluate the model quantitatively, we now focus on how the social security system
is determined by equilibrium voting of successive generations. It is not obvious whether an
equilibrium with social security can be supported as a political outcome in a democratic voting
process with non-altruistic agents. The current young and middle-aged do not benet from the
system, yet their support is critical. Indeed, the current young and middle-aged will always
choose to pay nothing in the current period, as long as they believe that the system will be there
for them in the future.
We consider a variant of constant social security taxes: (i) if a social security system is not
in place, it may start at any point, (ii) once a system is operating the tax remains constant, and
successive generations take a simple yes/no vote whether or not to keep the existing system. In
order to induce the agents in this economy to vote for social security according to this simple
rule, we introduce a reputational mechanism: if a majority of voters deviate from the social
security system, then the system cannot be implemented next period. Given that agents live for
three periods, we only need to punish a deviant (middle-aged) median voter for one period.
In particular, we assume that as long as successive generations of median voters prefer a
24From another point of view, the introduction of the social security might lower fertility as parents are less
likely to have children to care for their old age Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005).
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zero tax level, then the social security system does not start. If at some point, the preferred
tax level of the median voter is positive, then this tax is proposed by the median voter for a
yes/no vote, and, with single-peaked preferences, is accepted by the majority as the current tax
level. This tax level then remains in e¤ect as long as successive generations of median voters
prefer to keep it rather than get rid of it and live without social security. The median voter that
proposes a positive tax level for the rst time chooses a tax level that maximizes his lifetime
utility (assuming rationally that this tax level will remain forever). If this median voter prefers
a positive social security tax but instead proposes a zero tax (hoping that the next generation
will implement it and he will simply benet from it), the system cannot start next period. This
ensures that median voters do not procrastinate. As a result of this mechanism, when a median
voter sees that the social security tax is zero, there can be two scenarios: i) the system was never
implemented and can start this period, ii) the last periods median voter deviated and chose a
zero tax, and the system cannot start today. As a result, and as we detail in online Appendix
F, this reputational mechanism requires that the median voter knows whether the last periods
median voter deviated (i.e. did not start a system that was optimal for him) or not.25
The reputational mechanism we impose requires that the current voters not only know the
last periods social security tax level, but also whether the last periods median voter deviated.
Although this is a rather restrictive assumption, it is required to determine if the last periods
median voter was procrastinating. The current median voter needs to know if the last periods
median voter did not start the system with the hope that social security would start this period.
The only way to punish this type of procrastination is to know whether the last periods median
voter deviated.
Obviously one can consider other ways to aggregate agentss preferences. Suppose we simply
assume that when a majority of citizens are better of with social security, a benevolent govern-
ment starts the system and it continues as long as a majority of the citizens are better o¤ with
the system. The quantitative results with such a system would be identical to the ones presented
below as long as the government chooses a tax level that maximizes the lifetime utility of the
median voter. There are of course many levels of social security taxation that a majority of
25The reputational mechanism we use follows the standard political economy approach in the literature (see
Cooley and Soares 1999, Galasso 1999, and Boldrin and Rustichini 2000). Two early papers that emphasized the
political sustainability of social security were Browning (1975) and Sjoblom (1985). In the current analysis we
focus on taxes that maximize the lifetime utility of the median voter, although there can be many constant tax
levels that are sustainable under the reputational mechanism we have just described.
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agents might prefer to not having any social security taxes and the government can implement
any one of them. The political economy mechanism we describe simply allows us to pick one
such tax level.
5 Quantitative Examples
Consider now the general equilibrium framework from Section 2. Although the basic intuition
from the analytical results of Section 3 remain valid, there are now general equilibrium e¤ects
at play as well. This is critical for two reasons. First, the changes in relative productivity levels
and survival probabilities will not only determine farm wages and land returns via migration,
but will also a¤ect all prices via changes in individual capital accumulation decisions. Therefore,
it is fundamentally a quantitative question if the exogenous forces we consider and the general
equilibrium e¤ects that follow can generate a farm-to-city migration that is consistent with the
data. Second, in their decisions about the social security system, agents compare the return to
capital with the return to social security, but the return to capital is an endogenous variable.
This is important because while higher TFP levels after 1800 push the interest rate up, higher
capital accumulation associated with longer lives pushes it down. Since, as we have emphasized
above, the interest rate plays an important role in the optimal tax choice, general equilibrium
e¤ects on the interest rate are of fundamental importance to the question at hand.
We now show that a calibrated version of this economy generates an initial steady state
in which a majority of the population lives on the farm and the median voter chooses not to
introduce a social security system, and a new steady state in which the median voter chooses a
positive and sustainable social security tax. In online Appendix G, we show the transition from
the initial to nal steady state. We interpret the initial steady state as the U.S. economy in
1800 and the nal steady state as the U.S. economy in 1940. In order to develop quantitative
implications of this model economy, we rst choose functional forms for utility and production
functions and assign parameter values.
Let the utility function be u(c) = log(c): Since the production side of our model economy
closely follows Hansen and Prescott (2002), we borrow both functional forms and parameter
values from them. In particular, we assume that the production function on the farm sector is
given by
Y f = f

N f
 
Kf

[L]1   ;
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and in the city sector it is
Y c = c [N c]1  [Kc] :
These choices imply that
wc = (1  )c(N c) (Kc); (12)
wf = f (N f ) 1(Kf ); (13)
q = (1    )f (N f )(Kf ); (14)
and
r = rc = c(N c)1 (Kc) 1    = f (N f )(Kf ) 1    = rf : (15)
The parameter values we use are  = 0:6;  = 0:1; and  = 0:4:26 We set the length of a model
period to 20 years. We also assume that capital depreciates completely, i.e.  = 1.
Next we select the values for relative TFP levels and survival probabilities. We take TFP
numbers from Greenwood and Uysal (2005). For the 1800 economy we set f1800 = 
c
1800 = 1:
Since the relative TFP values are the key determinants of migration decisions in the model, we
keep f1940 = 1 and set 
c
1940 = 2:19: These choices imply that the relative TFP growth is as
reported by Greenwood and Uysal (2005) and reproduced in Figure 4. Historical estimates for
age-specic-mortality rates and life tables do not go back further than 1850 (see Haines 1998).
In 1850, a 60 year-old man had about a 47% chance of living to his 80th birthday. Since available
evidence does not indicate any signicant improvement in mortality between 1800 and 1850, we
set 1800 = 0:47:27 In 1940 the chances that a 60 year old man saw his 80th birthday increased
to about 58%. Therefore, we select 1940 = 0:58:28
26The value for capital share in the city (industrial) technology,  = 0:4; is the standard value for the postwar
U.S. economy. The labor share is assumed to be the same for both sectors,  = 1    = 0:6: Finally,  = 0:1
is picked to be consistent with historical evidence on agricultural incomes. See Hansen and Prescott (2002) for
details.
27According to Haines (1998), the crude death rate in New York City was as high in 1850 as it was in 1804 (see
Figure 1, page 150). In many New England towns there was not much improvement in life expectancy at age 20
either (see Table 1, page 151).
28Let Pi be the size of age-i population. We have data on P60 64; P65 69; P70 74; P75 80 and P80+ in 1850,
and on P60; P65; ::; P80 in 1940. For 1850, we calculate  as
 =
(P60 64 + P65 69 + P70 74 + P75 80 + P80+)=4
P60 64
;
which captures an average survival rate. The calculations for 1940 are done in a similar way.
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Finally, we assume that agents have at age-earning proles both on the farm and in the city,
i.e. "ji = 1 for j 2 ff; cg and i 2 fy;m; og: Age-earning proles in the 19th century did indeed
di¤er from the usual hump-shaped pattern. According to Kaelble and Thomas (1991), incomes
of working class household heads increased slightly between ages 20 and 40, but were pretty much
at after age 40. These at proles were a common feature of agricultural workers as well as
low skilled non-agricultural workers.29 We make the strong assumption that age-earning proles
were also at in the city. We consider this to be a conservative assumption for this exercise,
since a hump-shaped prole for city workers would simply increase the incentives of middle aged
workers to shift resources to their old age and increase the political support for social security
even further.
Note that all of these parameter values are xed prior to running our simulations. We are
left with only one more parameter to pick, : We set  = 0:818 (a yearly value of 0.99). This
value implies that the yearly return to capital in the 1940 steady state is about 6.1%.30 Table
II summarizes our parameter choices.
Table II  Parameter Values
     f1800 
c
1800 
f
1940 
c
1940 1800 1940
0.818 0.6 0.1 0.4 1 1 1 1 2.19 0.47 0.58
5.1 Results
Table III shows the results. In our 1800 economy everyone lives on the farm,  = 1. This
is consistent with the U.S. experience. At that time, about 94% of population lived in rural
areas, and the fraction of population working on the farm was possibly even higher (see Figure
1). In the 1800 steady state, the median voter is a landless-middle-aged farmer, who does not
want social security, so the equilibrium value of  is zero. Notice that this happens even though
2= (about 4.25) is larger than 1 + r, so the direct return to social security is greater than the
29Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) contrast relatively at wage proles of agricultural workers and land owners with
steep wage proles of entrepreneurs in the 19th century. They model the emergence of capitalism within a model
of structural transformation in which entrepreneurs inuence their childrens preferences in an attempt to make
them more patient.
30Cooley and Prescott (1995) report a value of 6.9 percent rate of return on capital for post-war period. See
Gomme and Rupert (2007) for a more recent discussion.
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return to capital. However, the middle-aged-landless farmer prefers to save nothing due to his
steep age-income prole.
Next, consider the 1940 economy. Now about 23% of the population lives on the farm, which
is exactly what is observed in the U.S. at that time (see Figure 1). This is quite remarkable since
nothing in our parameter choices targets directly the fraction of agents living on the farm. With
migration to the city, the median voter is a city worker whose preferred tax level is 0.106, about
19% of city wages.31
Table III - Initial and Final Steady States
1800 1940
 0 0.105
y 1 0.227
1 + r 2.466 3.247
wf .311 0.487
wc .178 0.549
q 0.384 0.142
q= 0.384 0.626
K 0.052 0.240
Kf 0.052 0.012
Kc 0 0.228
N f 2.470 0.587
N c 0 1.997
Median Voter middle-age-landless farmer middle-aged city worker
Consistent with historical experience, the return on capital is much higher in the new steady
state, despite an almost fourfold increase in aggregate capital stock. In 1940, about 23% of the
population lives on the farm, but a much smaller (about 5%) fraction of aggregate capital stock
is allocated to farm production. Also consistent with historical evidence, the rental value of land
declines signicantly. In 1940 it is about 37% of its 1800 value.32 Lastly, note that while the
31When social security was introduced the total (employee plus employer) tax rate was about 2%, which has
gradually increased to its current level of 15.3%.
32According to Hansen and Prescott (2002), the value of U.S. farmland relative to GDP declined from 88% in
1870 to 20% in 1950 (see Table 2, page 1209).
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returns per unit of land, q, fall, the returns to land for landholders, q=, actually rise, 0.38 to
0.63, which keeps people on the farm despite rising city wages.
In the new steady state, even though total labor supply in the city rises due to the increases
in life expectancy and migration, because of the increases in technological progress and in the
aggregate capital stock, the city wage rises. There is no technological advance on the farm. But
the out migration of farmers causes labor supply on the farm to fall, and so farm wages rise.
It is worth noting that the demographic changes alone would not lead to the rural-urban
transition that the U.S. experienced. When we only change survival probabilities, social security
does not emerge, because the change does not induce enough migration. Indeed, everybody
remains on the farm. The key e¤ect of this change is an increase in the capital stock because
people save more anticipating a longer life.
When only TFP changes, social security does emerge as an equilibrium outcome but the
rural/urban migration is not nearly as pronounced. Roughly 30% continue to live on the farm
(in the data and in our economy with changes in both survival probabilities and the TFP it
is 23%). Furthermore, the social security tax is higher than in the economy with both factors
at work. This underscores the conclusion that neither technology nor demographics alone is
su¢ cient to account for events but the interaction between the two is a powerful impetus for
social change.
5.2 Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions of our basic model. First, we allow agents to insure
against mortality risk. Annuity markets are quite thin today and they were certainly absent
in the 1940s (as well as 1800).33 Almost all quantitative work on social security assumes that
they are not available to agents.34 As a result, although annuities can (and do) play a role
theoretically, the assumption of a well-functioning annuities market is at odds with historical
experience. Introducing annuities to our framework crowds out the insurance role that social
security is currently providing. As one might expect, this reduces support for social security. In
an environment with perfect annuities, the level of social security that emerges is rather small.
Although, in a world with partial annuities (which is a more realistic assumption), we see social
security arising to an extent similar to that in our benchmark nal steady state. Allowing for
33Only 2 to 4% of elderly owned private annuities between the 1930s and the 1980s according to Warshawsky
(1988).
34See the large literature starting with Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1985).
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annuities eliminates accidental bequests of capital and highlights the role played by land (the
main form of inheritance in the 19th century) in the initial steady state, which we assume cannot
be annuitized.
Second, we allow agents who migrate to the city to claim income from the land they inherit
from their parents. It may seem restrictive that we deny migrants their entire land inheritance.
At rst glance, it appears that this assumption is driving the result that social security emerges
in the nal steady state. This is because as farmers migrate, if they keep their land inheritance,
there will be middle-age-landed and -landless city workers. The landless-city workers face an
age-income prole that is similar to the landless farmers, in the sense that their future land
income in old age creates a positive wedge in income across periods. It turns out that through
migration this wedge shrinks to the point where it no longer causes the middle-age landless (in
the city or on the farm) to oppose social security.
Lastly, we consider what happens when farmers are exempt from the social security system.
When the social security system was introduced farmers and other self-employed workers were
not covered by the system. They remained out of the system until the 1950 amendments (see
DeWitt 2010). In this case, a farmers preferred tax level only depends on its resulting general
equilibrium e¤ects. We nd that a farmers utility as a function of the tax level is not necessarily
single-peaked, so we limit voters to two choices: no social security and some positive level of
social security. For a very small city population, we nd the median voter still chooses a zero tax
level. Once TFP and survival probability increase to their 1940 levels, a positive level of social
security can be sustained.
5.2.1 Annuities
Incorporating annuities into the current framework alters individual savings decisions. In par-
ticular, it shifts up the return to assets relative to social security. As our analytical results show,
when middle-aged agents choose whether or not to support social security they compare the
return to social security, 2

; with the return to assets, 1 + r: With annuities, the return to assets
rises to 1+r

, so the comparison is now 2 vs. 1 + r: One role social security plays in our origi-
nal framework is to provide insurance against mortality risk. Therefore, introducing annuities
undermines support for social security. If the median voter wants to save, he is more likely to
choose assets over social security.
However, this is only part of the story as there are also general equilibrium e¤ects resulting
from the implementation of social security. In particular, the capital stock falls with the intro-
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duction of the social security. This implies an increase in the return to capital and a decrease
in wages compared to a world without social security. Hence, the median voter in 1940, a city
worker, might prefer to have social security (even if it provides a relatively low return and lowers
his wages) due to the higher returns on his savings it implies. The rst two columns of Table IV
contain the results with perfect annuities. Social security emerges in 1940 as the median voter
prefers social security as a result of its general equilibrium e¤ects on the returns to his savings.
The preferred tax level is much lower than when there are no annuities, highlighting the fact that
the return to assets is now higher. Note that there is more capital now as compared to the steady
states with no annuities (Table III), reecting the higher return on savings. This higher level of
capital also increases city wages (compared to a world without annuities), which contributes to
a higher level of migration.
Table IV- Extensions
Perfect Annuities Imperfect Annuities Migrants Inherit Land
1800 1940 1800 1940 1800 1940
 0 0.014 0 0.098 0 0.090
y 1 0.165 1 0.240 1 0.154
1 + r 1.961 2.412 2.397 3.145 2.466 3.193
wf 0.319 0.560 0.315 0.480 0.311 0.555
wc 0.208 0.672 0.192 0.560 0.178 0.555
q 0.394 0.119 0.389 0.149 0.384 0.111
q= 0.394 0.721 0.389 0.384 - -
K 0.067 0.420 0.059 0.249 0.052 0.265
Median middle-age middle-age middle-age middle-age middle-age middle-age
Voter landless farmer city worker landless farmer city worker landless farmer city worker
If annuities are not perfect, a higher level of social security emerges as a result of migration.
Suppose, for example, that the return to annuities is 1+r
(1+)
instead of 1+r

; with the parameter 
reecting the percentage leakage in the annuity system.35 As long as 1 +  < 1

; agents still get
an asset return that is higher than they would get without annuities. The second two columns
of Table IV show the results with  = 0:5. With this level of ; we have a nal steady state that
looks similar to the nal steady state in Table III.
35In order to keep the computational analysis simple we assume that this leak is returns that are not transferred
to farmers (not a leakage on actual capital). It is lost after the production take place.
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5.2.2 City Workers with Land Income
Suppose young farmers can receive land inheritances even after migrating to the city. The last
two columns of Table IV contain the steady state results. Note that city and farm wages are
equal in the nal steady state. Since migrants to the city can now earn land income, the only
di¤erence in the two sectors is the wages. If city wages were higher (as was the case in the
economy where migrants lose claims on land inheritances), then everyone would move to the
city. The nal steady states in Table III and the last column of Table IV look fairly similar,
suggesting that the landless-middle age, in this exercise, must now support social security. In
our original framework, the farm land that is left behind by those who migrate is spread among
the remaining farmers. So, the return to land is q

. If migrants keep their land, however, then
the return is q, as there is no land left behind to redistribute. In the new steady state, the return
to land, q, falls so much that it has very little e¤ect on the city workers age-income prole.
This is an example of a situation where the changes that instigate migration, combined with the
resulting migration, cause the middle-aged-landless median voter to switch from opposing social
security to supporting it. Allowing city workers to collect land income turns out not to be an
important restriction in our model.
5.2.3 Farmers Exempt From Social Security System
If farmers are exempt from the direct costs and benets of social security, then their voting
behavior will depend entirely on the e¤ect the tax has on prices. As the tax increases, the
capital stock will fall, pushing the return to capital up. For those in the city, this increase in
return to capital is accompanied by a higher tax payment. But farmers reap the benets of a
higher return to capital, without paying a cost. On the other hand, as the tax rises, the city
becomes a less attractive place for the marginal young farmer, causing farm wages fall. This
e¤ect is capped when the tax level gets high enough that there is no further migration. Due
to these conicting forces farmers can have non-single-peaked preferences. At very low levels
of taxation, they benet from out migration that increases their wages. At very high levels of
taxation, the negative impact on wages via reduced migration ceases, but the gain from a higher
return to capital continues.
Since we cannot guarantee that farmers have single-peaked preferences, in this section we
limit voters to two choices: no social security and some positive level of social security. As we
discuss in Section 4, doing this implies many possible levels of social security can be sustained
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by the median voter. The intention of this exercise is to demonstrate that, even if farmers
are exempt social security does not emerge with low TFP in the city, low survival probability,
and hence a small population in the city, but does still emerge when city TFP is high, survival
probability is high, and there is a large fraction of population in the city.
The voting behavior of city voters does not change when farmers are exempt from the system:
The young are worse o¤ the higher the tax, the old are better o¤ the higher the tax, and the
middle-age have an optimal interior tax level. The farmerschoices do change. Farmers who
have high asset levels are happier with higher taxes, since taxes boost returns to capital, while
those who have low asset levels are happier with lower taxes since their wages are higher. An
increase in city TFP and survival probability implies higher asset levels, and more farmers prefer
a positive tax level. It is also the case that there are many fewer farmers when TFP in the city
rises relative to farm TFP.
Given the parameters for 1800, there is no city population and no social security. Because
there is no city population to respond to the taxation, there are no general equilibrium e¤ects.
All tax levels provide identical utility to all farmers. Therefore, the question of whether or not
farmers support or oppose social security is vacuous. In order to make the question interesting,
we increase the TFP in the city enough (from  = 1 to  = 1:61) to generate a small population
in the city (1   = :03:) We nd that the median voter, who clearly is still a farmer, prefers a
zero tax level to any positive tax level. With our 1940 parameters, we nd that when the median
voter is given a choice between a tax of zero and any positive tax level below  = :14, he prefers
social security. Suppose the tax level is  = :105, which is what the median voter chooses when
farmers are part of the system. At this level of taxation, when farmers are exempt, the farm
population is 33%, which is higher than the 23% we nd in the original 1940 steady state. This
is no surprise, because when they are outside the system, young farmers prefer to stay on the
farm and avoid paying taxes. Because of this di¤erence in city and farm populations, city wages
are higher and farm wages are lower when farmers are exempt from the social security system.
Lastly, the return to capital is not as high when farmers are exempt (5.8% vs. 6.1%), because
farmers save more given their higher income.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model economy in which the structural transformation from a rural
to an urban economy gives rise to support for a social security system. We demonstrate how
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this can occur analytically within our framework. When everyone lives on the farm a majority
of the population prefers to rely on land inheritance for old-age security in place of a govern-
mental system of old-age pensions. Once enough migration takes place, a majority prefers some
positive level of social security. However, those who would like to implement social security have
heterogeneous preferences over how big the program should be. We assume majority voting as a
method for aggregating preferences, and then quantitatively investigate whether our framework
is consistent with the historical experience of the United States before and after social security
is implemented. We show that there is an initial steady state consistent with the United States
in the 1800s, with most people living on the farm and no social security system. Changes in life
expectancy and technological progress in the city that are in line with those observed in the data
give rise to a new steady state. In this nal steady state, the majority of the population lives in
the city and the median voter supports implementing a social security system.
One key element of our story is that middle-aged-landless farmers are unable to borrow
against the land inheritance they receive in old age, conditional on survival. This borrowing
constraint yields a steep age-income prole for the landless-middle-age farmers, which implies
that these individuals do not want to save, even if social security provides a high return. The
evidence shows that the sort of long-term borrowing required to undo this e¤ect was not available
over the time period we investigate. While alternative mechanisms may be able to provide an
impetus for social security, our explanation is the rst to give a quantitatively-consistent link
between industrialization and demographic change, and social security.
The current framework can be used to shed light on two issues of fundamental importance.
First is the question of why did di¤erent countries follow such di¤erent strategies in constructing
their social safety nets, choosing di¤erent degrees of reliance on state versus the market.36 The
current model provides a natural framework to link demographics, geography, and di¤erences
in the structural transformation of countries to di¤erences in social insurance institutions. The
second is the dramatic transformation that is taking place in China. Currently, there is no
national pension system (nor much in the way of social insurance) in China, but as the worlds
largest ever peacetime ow of migration continues, and the traditional support systems via the
family are dismantled, we would expect the demand for such institutions to grow. We leave these
questions for future research.
36Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) study how large inationary shocks in the rst half of the XX century,
which devastated middle class savings in some countries, a¤ected their reliance on state versus market institutions.
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7 Appendix A - Data Sources
Figure 1: Hernandez (1996), Table 4.
Figure 2: The urbanization rates are from the 1930 Census, Table 6, page 10, available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/16440598v2_TOC.pdf. The elderly population is calcu-
lated from Hobbs and Stoops (2002), Table 7, page A-19. The dates for state old age assistance laws are taken
from ElderWed, http://www.elderweb.com/home/node/2896.
Figure 3: The fraction of the labor force in agriculture is based on Mitchell (2003), Table B1 Economically
Active Population, by Major Industrial Groups, page 147. The adoption of social security dates are from the
Social Security Administration (2006).
Figure 4: Greenwood and Uysal (2005), Figure 9.
Figure 5: The data for 1850 and 1900 are from Haines (1998) and for 1950 are taken from the U.S. Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (1964). They are the average of the conditional survival probabilities from age
60 to 65, from 65 to 70, from 70 to 75 and 75 to 80. The 1850 numbers are for white males only.
Table I: GDP per capita is taken from Carter et al (2006), Table Ca9-19, Loans and Discounts of Banks is
from Carter et al (2006), Table Cj149-157, the U.S. population, which is used to calculate per capita loans and
discounts is from Carter et al (2006), Table Ca9-19. The information on maturities is from Hammond (1934),
page 89.
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ONLINE APPENDIX FOR
The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security
Elizabeth M. Caucutt, Thomas F. Cooley, and Nezih Guner
Appendix B - Updating and aggregating
The evolution of the asset distribution
Here we describe how G is determined. This entails updating  cm(a);  
c
o(a);  
f1
m (a),  
f0
m (a) and  
f
o (a) in
a manner that is consistent with the savings behavior of individuals. To this end, let Q = [0; a] be the set of
possible asset holdings for an individual in this economy. First, consider next periods asset distribution among
the old in the city. This distribution will be determined by the savings of the current middle-aged agents in the
city who survive to the next period. Then, it must be the case that for all ea 2 Q;
 c
0
o (ea) =  Z
Q
Ifacm(a; S) = eagd cm(a); (16)
where I(:) = 1 if acm(a; S) = ea ; and 0, otherwise. Similarly, the asset distribution of the old on the farm is
 f
0
o (ea) =  Z
Q
Ifaf0m (a; S) = eagd f0m (a) +  Z
Q
Ifaf1m (a; S) = eagd f1m (a); (17)
where, with some abuse of notation, we use I as the appropriate indicator function.
Next periods asset distribution among the middle-aged agents in the city is determined by the location and
savings decisions of young agents. One complication is that not all young agents make the same savings decisions.
While some of them are born in the city, others move to the city this period. Furthermore, some of those movers
had landless parents and some had landed parents. The following equation lists each of these cases:
 c
0
m(ea) = Z
Q
[Ifacy(acm(a; S); S) = eag+ (1  )Ifacy(acm(a; S); S) + acm(a; S) = eag]d cm(a)
+L(af0m (a; S); S)
Z
Q
[I0faf0gy (af0m (a; S); S) = eag (18)
+(1  )I01 faf0gy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S) = eag]d f0m (a)
+L(af1m (a; S); S)
Z
Q
[I1faf1gy (af1m (a; S); S) = eag
+(1  )I11 faf1gy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S) = eag]d f1m (a):
1
The rst line represents the total assets held by next periods middle-aged agents, who are young this period
and were also born in the city. Their savings decisions are given by acy(a
c
m(a; S); S): If they do not receive any
bequest, which happens with probability , these are all the assets they have. There is however a 1    chance
that they receive a bequest. In this case, their total assets consist of their own savings and their parents assets,
and are given by acy(a
c
m(a; S); S) + a
c
m(a; S): The next two lines consider the same cases for young agents who go
to the city and have landless parents, while the last two rows do the same for those who go to the city and have
landed parents.
Finally, next periods asset distribution for middle-aged agents on the farm is given by the savings decisions
of the young who choose to stay there. For the landless-middle-aged farmers we have,
 f0
0
m (ea) = [(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))Z
Q
I0faf0sy (af0m (a; S); S) = eagd f0m (a) (19)
+(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))
Z
Q
I1faf1sy (af1m (a; S); S) = eagd f1m (a)]:
And, for the landed-middle-aged farmers we have,
 f1
0
m (ea) = (1  )[(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))Z
Q
I01 faf0sy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S) = eagd f0m (a) (20)
+(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))
Z
Q
I11 faf1sy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S) = eagd f1m (a)]:
Evolution of the age-location distribution
In order to determine H; we consider how the location decisions are updated. Suppose the current location
decisions of agents are given by  = (y; m; o): Since all young agents survive to middle age, it must be the case
that 0m = y: Similarly, since the survival probability, ; is identical in both locations, 
0
o = m: The fraction of
young agents who will be on the farm, however, depends on the location decisions of those agents who are born
on the farm. A fraction y will be born on the farm next period. Yet, according to equation (11), some of them
will move to the city. Hence, for any S0; the total fraction who stay, among those whose parent does not have any
land, is given by
R
(1  L(af0m (a; S0); S0))d f0
0
m (a): The same expression for those whose parent has land is given
by
R
(1  L(af1m (a; S0); S0))d f1
0
m (a). Putting these pieces together implies the following consistency condition for
0
0 =

y
Z
(1  L(af0m (a; S0); S0))d f0
0
m (a)
+
Z
(1  L(af1m (a; S0); S0))d f10m (a)

; y; m

: (21)
Aggregation of assets
2
In this economy, assets are owned either by old or by middle-aged agents. Hence, given  cm(a) and  
c
o(a);
the current level of aggregate assets in the city, Ac, is simply
Ac = (1  m)
Z
ad cm(a) + (1  o)
Z
ad co(a): (22)
Similarly, the aggregate asset level on the farm, Af , is
Af = (1  )m
Z
ad f1m (a) + m
Z
ad f0m (a) + o
Z
ad fo (a): (23)
Given the particular demographic structure we have imposed, in order to determine the aggregate assets
next period, all we need to know is the asset distribution of the middle-aged agents. To see this, note that next
periods aggregate assets are determined by the savings decisions of young and middle-aged agents. Since the
savings decisions of the young depend on the expected bequests and these bequests are determined by the savings
of the middle-aged agents, in order to nd next periods aggregate asset level Ac
0
;  cm(a) and  
f
m (a) provide
su¢ cient information: In particular, next periods aggregate asset level in the city is given by
Ac
0
= (1  m)
Z 
acy(a
c
m(a; S); S) + a
c
m(a; S)

d cm(a) (24)
+m[
Z
L(af0m (a; S); S)a
f0g
y (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a)
+
Z
L(af1m (a; S); S))a
f1g
y (a
f1
m (a; S); S)d 
f1
m (a)]:
The rst line in this equation is the portion of next periods assets that is determined by the savings decisions
of the agents in the city. Here
R
acm(a; S)d 
c
m(a) gives the total savings of the middle-aged agents. These savings
are either carried to their old age, or left as accidental bequests and constitute part of the assets owned by middle-
aged agents next period. The term
R
acy(a
c
m(a; S); S)d 
c
m(a) is the other part of the assets owned by middle-aged
agents next period. It captures the savings done by the young, who in equilibrium anticipate correctly that they
will receive acm(a; S) as bequests. The next two lines capture the part of aggregate assets in the city that come
from young agents who just moved to the city. The savings decisions of these newcomers depend on their parents
asset and land holding status, and are di¤erent from those of the young agents who are born in the city. Hence, if
a young farmer whose parent has a units of assets and no land decides to go to the city, then L(af0m (a; S); S) = 1
and he saves af0gy (a
f0
m (a; S); S): The term
R
L(af0m (a; S); S)a
f0g
y (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a) is the aggregation of such
assets.
In a similar fashion, next periods aggregate asset level on the farm is also determined by the asset distribution
of landed- and landless-middle-aged agents and by the location decisions of the young. It is given by
Af
0
= m[
Z
[(1  L(af0m (a; S); S))af0sy (af0m (a; S); S) + af0m (a; S)]d f0m (a) + (25)Z
[(1  L(af1m (a; S); S))af1sy (af1m (a; S); S) + af1m (a; S)]d f1m (a)]
3
Like equation (24), the terms
R
af0m (a; S)d 
f0
m (a) and
R
af1m (a; S)d 
f1
m (a) represent the total savings of the middle-
aged-landless and -landed agents, respectively, while the terms
R
af0sy (a
f0
m (a; S); S)d 
f0
m (a) and
R
af1sy (a
f1
m (a; S); S)d 
f1
m (a)
are the savings done by the young who choose to stay on the farm.
Appendix C - Ordering Preferred Tax Levels
In contrast to middle-aged-landless farmers, both middle-aged-landed farmers and middle-aged-city workers
are likely to prefer a positive social security tax. As a result, when agents move to the city, middle-aged-city
workers and landed-farmers form a coalition that makes up a majority that supports implementing a social
security program. Understanding how the preferred tax levels of these individuals are ordered can help identify
who the decisive voter might be.
Using Proposition 3, we can order middle-aged individuals preferred tax levels by their initial asset levels,
within a location-land status category. For instance, among middle-aged-city workers, the optimal tax choice is
increasing in initial asset level. But since each location-land status category implies a di¤erent age-income prole,
it is less straightforward to compare preferred taxes across location-land status type. We can show that every
middle-aged-landed farmer enters middle-age with at least as much capital as every middle-aged-landless farmer,
which then implies that every landed farmer prefers a tax that is at least as great as every landless farmer. We
begin by showing that if a middle-aged-landed farmer has an initial asset level that is greater than or equal to that
of a middle-aged-landless farmer, then he prefers a higher tax level. Once this is established, we show that every
middle-aged-landed farmer has an initial asset level that is at least as great as every middle-aged-landless farmer.
Together, these imply that every landed-farmer prefers a tax that is at least as great as every landless-farmer.
Lemma 1. Suppose that a middle-aged-landed farmer has an initial asset level of a^ and prefers a tax level of
^ , and a middle-aged-landless farmer has an initial asset level of ~a and prefers a tax level of ~ : If a^  ~a; then
^  ~ :
Proof of Lemma 1:
First note that if 2 < 1 + r, then all middle-aged agents optimally choose a tax level of zero.
What if 2 > 1 + r? Let ^ be the preferred tax level of a landed-middle-aged farmer, who starts middle-age
with assets, a^. Since this person is making an optimal joint decision on taxes and assets, and we know the return
to taxes is higher than the return to assets, his middle-aged optimal asset choice will be zero. Since ^ is optimal
for the middle-aged-landed farmer, it solves:
 u0

wf"fm +
q

+ (1 + r)a^  ^

+ 2u0

wf"fo +
q

+
2^


 0:
4
Suppose a middle-aged-landless farmer, with assets ~a, faces this tax level of ^ (it may not be his optimal
choice). This means that his middle-age asset choice may be positive. Let this choice be given by a0(^)  0: We
can write the middle-aged-landless farmers tax rst order condition evaluated at ^ :
 u0  wf"fm + (1 + r)~a  ^   a0(^)+ 2u0wf"fo + q + (1 + r)a0(^) + 2^

:
Because the middle-aged-landless farmer has strictly lower consumption in middle age than the middle-aged-
landed farmer, and weakly greater consumption in old-age, his rst order condition evaluated at ^ will be strictly
lower than the landeds rst order condition evaluated at ^ . This implies that the landless-middle-aged farmer
prefers a weakly lower tax level:
 u0  wf"fm + (1 + r)~a  ^   a0(^)+ 2u0wf"fo + q + (1 + r)a0(^) + 2^

<
 u0

wf"fm +
q

+ (1 + r)a^  ^

+ 2u0

wf"fo +
q

+
2^


 0:
2
The landed-middle-aged farmer is only landed if his parent dies. Since his parent dies, he also receives a
capital bequest (if his parent had a positive asset level). On the other hand, the landless farmer receives no
bequest since his parent survived. Because the capital with which a farmer enters middle-age is the sum of his
own savings while young and any accidental bequest, it turns out that the landed farmer has a higher initial asset
level than the landless farmer. The highest initial asset level among landless farmers is less than or equal to the
lowest initial asset level (including bequests) of the landed farmers.
Lemma 2. Let a be the highest initial asset level of middle-age-landless farmers, and let a be the lowest initial
asset level of middle-age-landed farmers, then a  a:
Proof of Lemma 2
Let cy = Iy    a1; c0m = I0m+(1+ r)a1    a02; c1m = I1m+(1+ r)(a1+ b)    a12; c0o = Io+(1+ r)a02+ 2 ;
c1o = Io+(1+r)a
1
2+
2
 ; and a1(b) be the asset choice of a young farmer conditional on his parents own middle-age
saving b: Suppose:
 1  @a1
@b
 0:
This implies that a1 (asset level with which landless-farmer enters middle-age) is decreasing in b; and a1+b (asset
level with which landed-farmer enters middle-age)is increasing in b.
5
Suppose young farmers have parents who save b 2 [bmin; bmax]. Then, landless-farmers enter middle-age with
a1 2 [a1(bmax); a1(bmin)]; and landed-farmers enter middle-age with a1 2 [a1(bmin) + bmin; a1(bmax) + bmax]: Let
a1(bmin) = a; and a1(bmin) + bmin = a: Therefore, a  a:
To show  1  @a1@b  0; implicitly di¤erentiate the young farmers rst order condition in assets (Equation
32) with respect to the bequest level. Note, this expression contains the implicit derivatives of his middle-age
asset choices in each state of the world (gets bequest, and does not get bequest) with respect to the bequest level.
@a1
@b
=
 (1 + r)4u00(co1)u00(cm1 )

(1  )u00(cm0 ) + (1 + r)2u00(co0)

D
;
where
D = (1 + r)4u00(co1)u
00(cm1 )

(1  )u00(cm0 ) + (1 + r)2u00(co0)

+22(1 + r)4u00(cm1 )u
00(co0)u
00(cm0 ) + 
33(1 + r)6u00(cm0 )u
00(co0)u
00(co1)
+u00(cy)u00(cm0 )u
00(cm1 ) + (1 + r)
2u00(cy)u00(cm1 )u
00(co0)
+(1 + r)2u00(cy)u00(cmo )u
00(co1) + 
22(1 + r)4u00(cy)u00(co0)u
00(co1):
Since the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative, we have that @a1@b  0: Note that the rst two
terms in D are the negative of the numerator. Therefore, we have  1  @a1@b :
2
Proposition 5. Let  be the highest preferred tax level of middle-age-landless farmers, and let  be the lowest
preferred tax level of middle-age-landed farmers, then    :
Proof of Proposition 5: This follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
2
We next turn to comparisons across sectors to highlight how the tax preferences of middle-aged-city workers
relate to farmers. When it comes to optimal tax comparisons between farmers and city workers, we need to put
restrictions on their initial asset levels. We show in Proposition 6 that if a middle-aged-city worker has an initial
asset level that is equivalent to, or greater than, that of a middle-aged-landless farmer, then the middle-aged-city
worker prefers a higher tax level. We are, however, unable to rank the initial asset levels of all city workers relative
to all landless, or all landed farmers. These asset levels depend on the age-income proles of those in the city
relative to the farm, and the potential bequest levels in each place. It is reasonable to think that the young-city
worker will save more in the rst period than the young farmer, because the young farmer has some positive
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probability of inheriting land in the next period, receiving a big boost to his income. However, city workers also
earn higher wage income than farmers (if not, then living on the farm would dominate living in the city and no
one would live in the city). Higher income while young and middle-age has an ambiguous e¤ect on saving while
young.
Proposition 6. Suppose that a middle-aged-city worker has an initial asset level of a^ and prefers a tax level
of ^ , and a middle-aged-landless farmer has an initial asset level of ~a and prefers a tax level of ~ : If a^  ~a; then
^  ~ :
Proof of Proposition 6:
First note that if 2 < 1 + r, then all middle-aged agents optimally choose a tax level of zero.
What if 2 > 1 + r? Let ^ be the preferred tax level of a middle-aged guy in the city, who starts the period
with a^ assets. Since he is making an optimal joint decision on taxes and assets, and we know the return to taxes
is higher than the return to assets, his optimal middle-age asset choice will be zero. Since ^ is optimal for him,
it solves:
 u0 (wc"cm + (1 + r)a^  ^) + 2u0

wc"co +
2^


 0:
Suppose a middle-aged-landless farmer with asset level, ~a, faces this tax level of ^ (it may not be his optimal
choice). This means that his middle-age asset choice may be positive. Let this choice be given by a0(^)  0: We
can write the middle-aged-landless farmers rst order condition with respect to the tax level, evaluated at ^ :
 u0  wf"fm + (1 + r)~a  ^   a0(^)+ 2u0wf"fo + q + (1 + r)a0(^) + 2^

:
In equilibrium, if anyone is living in the city, it has to be the case that: wc"cm  wf"fm; and wf"fo + q > wc"co:
This implies that the middle-aged-landless farmer has strictly lower consumption in middle age than the
middle-aged-city worker, and weakly greater consumption in old-age, his rst order condition evaluated at ^ will
be strictly lower than the city guys rst order condition evaluated at ^ . This implies that the landless-middle-aged
farmer prefers a weakly lower tax level:
 u0  wf"fm + (1 + r)~a  ^   a0(^)+ 2u0wf"fo + q + (1 + r)a0(^) + 2^

<
 u0 (wc"cm + (1 + r)a^  ^) + 2u0

wc"co +
2^


 0:
2
Both landed farmers and city workers have fairly constant age-income proles, so this comparison is not as
straightforward as was the case for city workers and middle-aged-landless farmers. Suppose that "jm = "
j
o; j = f; c:
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In this case, both middle-aged-city workers and middle-aged-landed farmers have a at age-earning prole, i.e.
for both Im = Io = I: The following proposition shows how optimal taxes change with I:
Proposition 7. Suppose that the optimal tax level for an individual with constant earnings, I, in middle and
old age, and initial asset level, a, is  > 0. Suppose u(c) = c
1 
1  ; if  >
1
2 ; then
@
@I > 0:
Proof of Proposition 7:
Since the preferred tax level of the landed-middle-aged farmer is strictly positive,  > 0:
 u0 (I + (1 + r)a  ) + 2u0

I +
2


= 0:
Implicitly di¤erentiate this condition to get:
@
@I
=
u00(I + (1 + r)a  )  2u00(I + 2 )
u00(I + (1 + r)a  ) + 4 u00(I + 2

 )
: (26)
So, the preferred tax level is increasing in income if u00(I + (1 + r)a   ) < 2u00(I + 2 ); otherwise, it is
decreasing in income. Let cm = I + (1 + r)a  ; and co = I + 2 :
With CES utility we have u(c) = c
1 
1  ; u
0(c) = c1 ; and u00(c) =  c  1:
If we substitute the functional forms into u0(cm) = 2u0(co); (the rst order condition determining the optimal
tax level of the middle-aged individual) we nd
2 = (
co
cm
):
Substitute this into the numerator of Equation 26. After some algebra, the sign of the numerator is the same as
the sign of: cm   co:
From the individuals optimal tax problem we have, u0(cm) = 2u0(co): Since, u00() < 0; if  > :5; we have
cm < co:
Therefore, @

@I > 0:
2
Proposition 7 states that with standard CES utility and a discount factor greater than one half, which is the
case we consider in our quantitative work, the preferred tax level rises with income level I: How do incomes of
middle-aged-city workers and middle-aged-landed farmers compare? If anyone chooses to live on the farm, the
middle-aged-city worker has lower earnings in both periods than the landed farmer, and as a result, Proposition 7
implies that the preferred tax level of a middle-aged-city worker is lower than the preferred tax level of a middle-
aged-landed farmer who has the same level of initial assets. Together with Proposition 6, this implies that the
preferred taxes of middle-aged-city workers are likely to fall between middle-aged-landless and -landed farmers,
leaving their exact ordering a quantitative question.
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Appendix D - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The problem of a middle-aged agent who faces a tax level  , and who enters the
period with asset level a; is given by:
max
a00
fu (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + u(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

)g: (27)
This yields the following rst order condition for a0 :
 u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + (1 + r)u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

)  0: (28)
Let cm = Im + (1 + r)a     a0; and co = Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2 :
i. Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 28) with respect to assets:
u00(cm)[ 1  @a
0
@
] = (1 + r)u00(co)[(1 + r)
@a0
@
+
2

];
which yields:
@a0
@
=
 u00(cm)  2(1 + r)u00(co)
u00(cm) + (1 + r)2u00(co)
:
If 2 > (1 + r), then
@a0
@ <  1:
ii. Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 28) with respect to assets:
u00(cm)[(1 + r)  @a
0
@a
] = (1 + r)2u00(co)
@a0
@a
;
which yields:
@a0
@a
= (1 + r)

u00(cm)
u00(cm) + (1 + r)2u00(co)

:
Therefore, 1 + r > @a
0
@a > 0:
iii. Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 28) with respect to assets:
u00(cm)[1  @a
0
@Im
] = (1 + r)2u00(co)
@a0
@Im
;
which yields:
@a0
@Im
=
u00(cm)
u00(cm) + (1 + r)2u00(co)
:
Therefore, 1 > @a
0
@Im
> 0:
Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 28) with respect to assets:
 u00(cm)@a
0
@Io
= (1 + r)u00(co)[(1 + r)
@a0
@Io
+ 1];
which yields:
@a0
@Io
=
 (1 + r)u00(co)
u00(cm) + (1 + r)2u00(co)
:
Therefore, 0 > @a
0
@Io
>  1:
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Proof of Proposition 2:
The middle-age persons optimal tax problem is given by:
max
0
fu (Im + (1 + r)a     a0()) + u(Io + (1 + r)a0() + 2

)g: (29)
The rst order condition for this problem, with the rst order condition for assets substituted in, is:
 u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + 2u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

)  0: (30)
To prove the rst part of this Proposition, we need to show that when the return to social security is strictly
greater than the return to assets for a middle-aged agent, his optimal asset level is zero. We do this by showing
that when 2 > 1 + r, the middle-aged agents rst order condition for assets (Equation (28)) is strictly negative.
We know that the middle-aged agents rst order condition for the tax level (Equation (30)) is non-positive:
0   u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + 2u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

):
Using the fact that 2 > (1 + r), this can be rewritten as:
0 >  u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + (1 + r)u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

);
where the right hand side is just the middle-aged agents rst order condition for assets. Since this is strictly
negative, the asset level is zero.
To prove the second part of the Proposition, we need to show that when the return to assets is strictly greater
than the return to social security, the optimal tax level is zero. We do this by showing that when 2 < 1 + r, the
middle-aged agents rst order condition for the tax level (Equation (30)) is strictly negative. We know that the
middle-aged agents rst order condition for assets (Equation (28)) is non-positive:
0   u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + (1 + r)u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

):
Using the fact that (1 + r) > 2, this can be rewritten as:
0 >  u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + 2u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

);
where the right hand side is just the middle-aged agents rst order condition for the tax level. Since this is
strictly negative, the tax level is zero.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let cm = Im + (1 + r)a     a0; and co = Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2 :
i. Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 30) with respect to the tax
level:
u00(cm)[(1 + r)  @
@a
] = 2u00(co)
@
@a
2

;
which yields:
@
@a
=
u00(cm)(1 + r)
u00(cm) + 4 u
00(co)
:
Therefore, 1 + r > @@a > 0:
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ii. Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 30) with respect to the tax
level:
u00(cm)[1  @
@Im
] = 2u00(co)
2

@
@Im
;
which yields:
@
@Im
=
u00(cm)
u00(cm) + 4 u
00(co)
:
Therefore, 1 > @@Im > 0:
Implicitly di¤erentiate the middle-aged agents rst order condition (Equation 30) with respect to assets:
 u00(cm) @
@Io
= 2u00(co)[
2

@
@Io
+ 1];
which yields:
@
@Io
=
 2u00(co)
u00(cm) + 4 u
00(co)
:
Therefore, 0 > @@Io >  1:
Proof of Proposition 4:
Let the earnings of the young person be given by Iy: Let I0m be middle-aged earnings when there is no bequest,
and let I1m be middle-aged earnings when there is a bequest. Since city workers only earn wage income in each
state, they have I0m = I
1
m; while I
0
m and I
1
m are di¤erent for young farmers since in the latter case they receive
extra income from land.
The young person who faces a tax level  , and has a possible bequest of b(), solves the following problem:
max
a10; a020; a120
fu (Iy      a1) + u
 
I0m + (1 + r)a1      a02

(31)
+(1  )u  I1m + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12
+22u(Io + (1 + r)a
0
2 +
2

)
+2(1  )u(Io + (1 + r)a12 +
2

)g:
This problem yields the following rst order conditions in a1; a02, and a
1
2, respectively
 u0 (Iy      a1) + (1 + r)u0
 
I0m + (1 + r)a1      a02

+ (32)
(1  )(1 + r)u0  I1m + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12  0;
 u0  I0m + (1 + r)a1      a02+ (1 + r)u0(Io + (1 + r)a02 + 2 )  0; (33)
and
 u0  I1m + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12+ (1 + r)u0(Io + (1 + r)a12 + 2 )  0; (34)
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If the young agent is choosing his most preferred tax level, the problem he solves is:
max
0
fu (Iy      a1()) + u
 
I0m + (1 + r)a1()     a02()

(35)
+(1  )u  I1m + (1 + r)(a1() + b())     a12()
+22u(Io + (1 + r)a
0
2() +
2

)
+2(1  )u(Io + (1 + r)a12() +
2

)g:
The rst order condition for this problem, with the rst order conditions for assets substituted in, is:
 u0 (Iy      a1)  u0
 
I0m + (1 + r)a1      a02
  (1  )u0  I1m + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12+
22u0(Io + (1 + r)a02 +
2

) + 22(1  )u0(Io + (1 + r)a12 +
2

)
+(1  )(1 + r) @b
@
u0
 
I1m + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12
  0: (36)
We begin by proving that all three asset levels from a young persons problem, a1; a02; and a
1
2; cannot all be
strictly positive if the return to social security is greater than the return to assets for a young agent. We do this
in three parts.
First, show that if a1 > 0 and a02 > 0, then a
1
2 = 0: Since a1 and a
0
2 are strictly positive, we know Equation
(32) and Equation (33) both hold with equality. Solve Equation (32) for u0 (Iy      a1) ; and Equation (33) for
u0(Io + (1 + r)a02 +
2
 ); and substitute these into the rst order condition for  , Equation (36), to get:
u0
 
Im + (1 + r)a1      a02
 
(1 + r)(1  )

2

  (1 + r)2   (1 + r)

 u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a121 + (1 + r)1  @b@

+ 2u0

Io + (1 + r)a
1
2 +
2


 0:
Because the return to social security is strictly greater than the return to assets, the rst piece of the above
inequality is strictly positive. This implies that:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a121 + (1 + r)1  @b@

+ 2u0

Io + (1 + r)a
1
2 +
2


< 0:
The expression,
 
1 + (1 + r)
 
1  @b@

; is strictly positive. Therefore:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12+ 2 
1 + (1 + r)
 
1  @b@
u0Io + (1 + r)a12 + 2

< 0:
Since 2 + (1 + r)
2 @b
@ > 1 + r + (1 + r)
2; we have 2
(1+(1+r)(1  @b@ ))
> (1 + r): This implies that:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12+ (1 + r)u0Io + (1 + r)a12 + 2

< 0;
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which means the rst order condition for a12 holds with strict inequality, so that a
1
2 = 0:
Second, show that if a1 > 0 and a12 > 0, then a
0
2 = 0: Since a1 and a
1
2 are strictly positive, we know Equation
(32) and Equation (34) both hold with equality. Solve Equation (32) for u0 (Iy      a1) ; and Equation (34) for
u0(Io + (1 + r)a12 +
2
 ); and substitute these into the rst order condition for  , Equation (36), to get:
u0
 
Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12
1  
1 + r

2

+ (1 + r)2
@b
@
  (1 + r)  (1 + r)2

 u0  Im + (1 + r)a1      a02(1 + (1 + r)) + 2u0Io + (1 + r)a02 + 2

 0:
Because the return to social security is strictly greater than the return to assets, the rst piece of the above
inequality is strictly positive. This implies that:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)a1      a02(1 + (1 + r)) + 2u0Io + (1 + r)a02 + 2

< 0:
Dividing by, (1 + (1 + r)); yields:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)a1      a02+ 2(1 + (1 + r))u0

Io + (1 + r)a
0
2 +
2


< 0:
Since 2 + (1 + r)
2 @b
@ > 1 + r + (1 + r)
2; we have 2 > 1 + r + (1 + r)
2; or 21+(1+r) > (1 + r): This implies that:
 u0  Im + (1 + r)a1      a02+ (1 + r)u0Io + (1 + r)a02 + 2

< 0;
which means the rst order condition for a02 holds with strict inequality, so that a
0
2 = 0:
Third, show that if a02 > 0 and a
1
2 > 0, then a1 = 0: Since a
0
2 and a
1
2 are strictly positive, we know Equation
(33) and Equation (34) both hold with equality. Solve Equation (33) for u0
 
Io + (1 + r)a
0
2 +
2


; and Equation
(34) for u0(Io + (1 + r)a12 +
2
 ); and substitute these into the rst order condition for  , Equation (36), to get:
 u0 (Iy      a1) + (1 + r)u0
 
Im + (1 + r)a1      a02
 2
(1 + r)2
  1
1 + r

+(1  )(1 + r)u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12 2(1 + r)2   11 + r + @b@

 0:
Because 2 + (1 + r)
2 @b
@ > (1 + r) + (1 + r)
2, it follows that 2(1+r)2   11+r + @b@ > 1; and 2(1+r)2   11+r > 1:
Therefore, we have the following:
 u0 (Iy      a1) + (1 + r)u0
 
Im + (1 + r)a1      a02

+(1  )(1 + r)u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12 < 0;
which means the rst order condition for a1 holds with strict inequality, and a1 = 0:
The second piece of the proof entails showing that when the return to social security is strictly less than the
return to assets, the tax optimal tax level is zero.
13
Solve the rst order condition for a1 (Equation (32)) for u0 (Iy      a1), the rst order condition for a02 (Equa-
tion (33)) for u0
 
Io + (1 + r)a
0
2 +
2


, and the rst order condition for a12 (Equation (34)) for u
0  Io + (1 + r)a12 + 2  ;
and substitute these weak inequalities into the rst order condition for the tax level (Equation (36)), to get:
 u0 (Iy      a1)  u0
 
Im + (1 + r)a1      a02
  (1  )u0  Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12+
22u0(Io + (1 + r)a02 +
2

) + 22(1  )u0(Io + (1 + r)a12 +
2

)
+(1  )(1 + r) @b
@
u0
 
Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12

 
1 + r
u0
 
Im + (1 + r)a1      a02
 2

  (1 + r)2   (1 + r)

+
(1  )
1 + r
u0
 
Im + (1 + r)(a1 + b())     a12
 2

+ (1 + r)2
@b
@
  (1 + r)2   (1 + r)

:
The fact that 2 < (1 + r) + (1 + r)
2; implies that 2 + (1+ r)
2 @b
@ < (1 + r) + (1 + r)
2; which means the right
hand side of the above expression is strictly negative. Therefore, the left hand side of the above expression, or
the rst order condition with respect to  is negative, and  = 0:
Appendix E - Can Social Security Taxes be Negative?
We have imposed a non-negativity constraint on the tax level. If we consider the optimal tax problem of the
middle-aged individual, but allow for the tax level to be negative we have the following rst order condition
 u0 (Im + (1 + r)a     a0) + 2u0(Io + (1 + r)a0 + 2

) = 0:
If 2

> 1 + r, then according to Proposition 2, a0 = 0, leaving37
 u0 (Im + (1 + r)a  ) + 2u0(Io + 2

) = 0:
In order for the agent to optimally choose a non-negative tax level, this rst order condition must be strictly
positive when  = 0; i.e. the following must hold:
 u0 (Im + (1 + r)a) + 2u0(Io) > 0:
Clearly, what is important to ensure the middle-aged agent chooses a non-negative tax is that he consumes
relatively less when he is old, and so would like to move resources to his old age. This is more likely to happen if
37If the return to capital is greater than social security, middle-age individuals will choose an innite negative
tax, save it all, and get a higher return from that saving than they have to pay back in social security tax the
next period.
14
 is relatively large (people value the future) and the age-income prole is relatively at (people are more likely
to want to save).
If we assume a constant elasticity of substitution utility (CES), u(c) = c
1 
1  ; this inequality reduces to
(2) 
1
 <
Im + (1 + r)a
Io
:
If  = 1
2
; then income in middle-age needs to be at least as great as income in old age in order for the agent to
choose a non-negative tax level. Not surprisingly, as the discount factor () rises, the ratio between middle-age
income and old-age income needed to ensure a non-negative tax falls. But, the more the individual desires to
smooth consumption across periods (), the higher this income ratio needs to be for the agent to choose a positive
tax level.
What determines the Im
I0
ratio? For city workers, who earn wc"cm when they are middle-aged and w
c"co when
they are old, and for landed farmers, who earn wf"fm +
q

and wf"fo+
q

; this ratio depends on their life-cycle
e¢ ciency units. The larger their middle aged labor income relative to their old age labor income, the more likely
they are to prefer a positive tax level. For a landless farmer, however, on top of their life-cycle e¢ ciency units,
this ratio depends crucially on the size of the return to land since his middle and old age incomes are wf"fm and
wf"fo+
q

; respectively. The more important land is to production, the higher its return, leading to a steeper
age-income prole, and downward pressure on the optimal social security tax level.
It is important to note that negative social security, which would transfer resources to middle-aged and young
from the old, is not implementable with a reputational mechanism. A middle-aged median voter will vote for a
positive social security tax in order to get social security payments next period. Suppose now that the middle-aged
median voter prefers a transfer from the old. The old cannot be convinced to transfer resources to the middle-age
and young. They are in the last period of their life and have no altruism towards their children. There are no
periods left in which to impose a punishment on them if they do not comply.
Appendix F - Political economy
In order to dene the political economy equilibrium, we update the aggregate state of the economy, so that
S = (	;;  1; h 1), where  1 is the social security tax and h 1 is an indicator of whether the last periods
median voter deviated (i.e. introducing or keeping social security was optimal for the median voter last period,
but he did not do so). Hence if  1= h 1= 0; there is no social security and it can start this period. If  1> 0
and h 1= 0; there is a social security system and it can continue this period. Finally, if  1= 0 and h 1= 1;
the median voter did not start or chose not to continue a system that was optimal for him (i.e. he deviated), and
the system cannot start next period in order to punish the last periods median voter.
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We represent the evolution of the political state by the function P . The role of the function P is to determine
a state-contingent social security system. In particular, we assume that the social security tax level for the current
period,  ; and the indicator for the next period h, are given by ( ; h) = P (	;;  1; h 1); and agents take
the policy rule P as given when making their economic decisions. Note that a system with a social security tax
 that never changes is trivially dened by ( ; 0) = P (S) for all S: Let P (S) represent such a system.
Denition 1. For any  1 > 0 and h 1 = 0; we will say that a policy function P (S) is sustainable in state
S = (	;;  1; 0); if
VM (	;;  1; 0;P )  VM (	;)
where VM is the remaining lifetime utility of the median voter in an economy with current aggregate state S =
(	;;  1; 0) and policy function P; and VM is the remaining lifetime utility of the median voter if social security
is eliminated forever.
The value VM (	;) only depends on 	 and ; i.e. the aggregate state (the distribution of physical capital
and the distribution of agents between the city and the farm) in which the social security tax is eliminated. In
other words, P is sustainable in S if a majority of voters vote yesfor keeping  1 today with tomorrows taxes
determined by P , instead of moving to an economy with no social security. Let the indicator function M(S;P )
denote the associated yes/no decision of the median voter, i.e.
M(	;;  1; 0;P ) =
(
1; if VM (	;;  1; 0;P )  VM (	;)
0; otherwise
:
A median voter considering a future without social security takes into account the resulting rise in aggregate
capital stock and the decline in the rate of return. The decline in the rate of return gives the median voter an
additional reason (besides reputation) to keep an existing system.
Suppose todays state is  1= 0 and h 1= 1, i.e. the social security system was optimal but was not
implemented. In this case, there cannot be a social security system today, i.e.
P (	;; 0; 1) = (0; 0): (37)
A median voter who deviates is punished only for one period, i.e. there is no voting next period. The following
period, social security can start again.
If todays political state is  1 > 0 and h 1 = 0, then there is an existing social security system. In this case,
the current generation simply takes a yes/no vote and the system either continues at the same tax level or ends
because of a no vote, i.e.
P (	;;  1; 0) =
(
( 1; 0); if M(	;;  1; 1;P ) = 1
(0; 1); if M(	;;  1; 1;P ) = 0
: (38)
IfM(	;;  1; 0;P ) = 0 ; then the median voter ends the system. It will remain non-operative next period,
but can start again after that (see Equation 37). As a result the median voter that votes no against the existing
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 1; with the hope that a social security system can start next period, is punished. Again after this punishment,
the system can restart, if it is optimal for the future median voters to do so.
When  1 = 0 and h 1 = 0, a social security system is not operating. It may, or may not start today,
depending on the preferences of the median voter. Let b(S) be the proposal by the median voter at state S:
Furthermore, let  = argmax VM (S;P ) be the optimal tax level chosen by the median voter under the constant
policy rule P: We specify P such that
P (	;; 0; 0) =
8>><>>:
(0; 0); if b =  = argmax VM (S;P ) = 0
(; 0); if b =  = argmax VM (S;P ) > 0
(0; 1); if b 6=  : (39)
The current median voter might optimally choose a positive tax, and the system starts. He might optimally
choose a zero tax, and the system does not start. In this case, tomorrows median voter may start social security.
If he proposes a tax level that is not his optimal choice, this is a deviation and then the system will not be
available next period.
A political equilibrium is then a recursive competitive equilibrium with the policy function P dened by
equations (37), (38), and (39).
Appendix G - Transition
Table VI illustrates the transitional dynamics. Computing the transition is non-trivial. Not only do the
capital stock and location choices (and hence prices) have to be consistent with individual asset accumulation
and migration decisions, but the sequence of tax levels that individuals expect must be those that the median
voter in each generation chooses. We assume that the economy is at its 1800 steady state initially (period 0)
and suddenly and unexpectedly productivity and life expectancy increase to their 1940 values. In the period
of the change (period 1), the capital stock is xed at its initial steady state level. However, due to the higher
productivity in the city and the higher survival probability, the city is a much more attractive location for young
farmers and many choose to migrate, y = 0:18: This population shift alters the labor supply on the farm and
in the city. Indeed, since a large fraction of population migrates in the rst period of the transition, both farm
and city wages rise. Given the rise in productivity levels, because the capital stock is xed at its old steady state
level, the return to capital increases signicantly from 2.47 to 5.68. As people start moving away from the farm,
the return to land starts to fall as well.
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Table VI - Transition
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 0 0 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Farm population 1 0.670 0.368 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184
1 + r 2.466 5.682 3.685 3.483 3.261 3.192 3.155 3.141
wf 0.311 0.324 0.426 0.518 0.522 0.523 0.524 0.524
wc .178 0.378 0.504 0.524 0.547 0.555 0.559 0.561
q 0.384 0.268 0.179 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.124
K 0.052 0.052 0.165 0.223 0.249 0.257 0.262 0.264
Because the migration only a¤ects the location of the young, in period 1 the median voter is still a middle-
aged landless farmer, who prefers no social security.38 So, in the initial period of the change, the tax remains
unchanged at 0. However, agents are aware that the mass migration of young farmers to the city will shift the
identity of the median voter in the next period, and alter support for social security. In the second period of the
transition, the initial young migrants now become middle-aged-city workers, who support a positive (sustainable)
level of social security,  = :09. After the third period, migration stops and the fraction of young farmers remains
at 0.18. However, the new steady state farm population takes three periods to attain, as the initial young migrants
age. As the population reallocates between the two locations and people start accumulating capital, the return
to capital falls to 3.69, and then converges to 3.14 in the new steady state.39
38We computationally verify that along the transition preferences are single peaked in each period.
39Note that y (farm population after period 2) in Table VII is less than its value in Table IV (18% versus
23%). Associated with this, the nal tax rate is lower than the one in Table IV ( 0.09 versus 0.10). This happens
since migration overshoots along the transition and we do not allow these agents to go back to the farm. When
we compute the nal steady state directly, this does not happen.
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